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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Few philosophers have ever given more consistent etaphasis to 
the value and realIty of the spirit than did the Neoplatonist 
Plotinus. Indeed, the reality of the material universe is sup-
pressed almost entirely; whatever degree of reality it has is 
merely a reflection of the true reality, which is spiritual. 
In vl"ew of this dominant note in the thought o.r, Plotinus, 
some defense of the subject matter of this thesis seems in order. 
Why bother to discuss an aspect of Plotinus whioh at best can be 
of relatively little importance? This question becomes even more 
relevant in the light of a not unjustifiable remark by a reoog-
nized Plotinian scholar that the treatment of matter, particular-
ly of matter oonsidered as the prinCiple of evil, is the "least 
coherent and satisfactory part of Plotlnus t s system."l 
The discussion proposed in this thesis is not, however, al-
together irrelevant and unimportant in the study of Plotinus. 
Matter may vlell be the "outlaw" in his system, an element to be 
lArthur H. Armstrong, "Plotinus's Doctrine of the Infinite 
and Its Significance for Christian Thought," Downside Review, 
LXXIII (January, 1955), 49. 
1 
2 
£ought against and overcome in the struggle to find one's true 
self and to attain union with the ultimate real1ty of the One. 
Nevertheless, matter fits into the system as a necessary part of 
the whole; and Plotinus is by no means reluotant to treat of it 
and its function in his philosophy. 
One of the positive benefits of the study to be undertaken 
here is that it may serve to indicate some of the inherent dif-
ficulties of' an emanational metaphYSics. Nuoh of the confusion 
and "lncoherencen in Plotinus' treatment of matter arises, it 
would seem, from an attempt to reconcile his theory of emanation 
from the Good with his theory of matter as both a non-entitative 
substratum and the principle of evil. 
The explicit aim of this thesis is simply to expose the doc-
trine of Plotinus concerning matter. The point of emphasis will 
be to discover the nature of matter as Plotinus sees it, whether 
it be considered as the substratuul of material beings or as the 
prime evil and source ot all other secondary evils. Henee, there 
will be no lengthy disoussion of' the relationship between soul 
and material bodies or of other such side issues. Even the 
question of the origin or "creationll of' matter will be touched 
upon only briefly in Chapter III. 
A question whioh is olosely connected with the subject or 
this thesis 1s that of the so-called contradiotion which at least 
two eomrrlentators2 olaim to find between matter as a substratum 
2A~ H. Armstrong and. W. R. Inge. This pOlnt will be dis .. · 
3 
and matter as the prinoiple of evil. It was preoisely an interest 
in this oontradiotion that eventually led to the choice of the 
present subject for this thesis. The investigations made 1n 
preparation for this work have led the author to the oonclusion 
that the contradiction in Plotlnus' philosophy of matter--if there 
is any oontradlction--does not lIe where Armstrong and Inge find 
it. 
Though it must be insisted that the direct aim of this thesis 
is not to justif,. any personal opinion concerning this alleged 
contradiotion, the subject matter and order of treatment has been 
so arranged, especially in Chapters III and V, that a case may be 
made at the end of Chapter V for the author's view in this 
question. 
In aocord with the general purpose of this theSiS, the 
procedure to be followed will consist almost exclusively in an 
exegesis of the text of Plotinus, USe being made both of the 
original and of translations. Chief consideration will be given 
to Plotinus' ~ erofesso treatises concerning matter, and these 
will be supplemented by enlightening secondary texts. Of the 
fifty-tour treatises which comprise the F~eads four may be said 
to be !!. Erofesso discussions of matter: "On the Nature and 
Source of Evils," "On Matter," "On Potential and Actual Being," 
cussed In Chapter V, where references to Armstrong and lnge will 
be eited. 
4 
and "On the Impassivity of' the Unembodied.,,3 The purpose of work-
ing direotly with these primary sources is that whatever conclu-
sions are reached conoerning the nature of matter will be based on 
Plotinus himself and not on the opinions of his commentators. 
A sparing use of secondary sources will be made for the pur-
pose of obtaining leads into the meaning of Plotinus himself. 
Suoh sources will also be used to indicate ooncurrence of opinion 
and, in a few instances, divergence of opinion. 
Mention must also be made of the fact that this thesis 1s 
oonoerned only with an exposition of Plotinus' theories of sensible 
matter, Le., the matter which is involved in the material universe. 
Sensible matter is to be distinguished from the intelligible 
matter about whioh Pl~tinus also speaks. The same treatise4 which 
provides ·the main source for Plotinus' dootrine on sensible matter 
as the substratum of material beings is also the chief source oon-
cerning the nature of intelligible matter. A brief disoussion of 
the nature of intelligible matter and its difrerences from sensi-
ble matter will be taken up briefly in an appendix to this thesis. 
By way of further introduction to the subject of this thesiS, 
the general reader will find a brie.f his torical sketch of Plotiuus 
and an account of his writings very helpful. 
3I. 8; II. 4; II. 5; and III. 6 respectively. For an expla-
nation of the references to the bnneads of P10tinus see Chapter 
II, p. 12, n.3. 
4II • 4. 
The Neoplatonio school of philosophy arose in Egypt in the 
third oentury t~ .• D. Its reputed founder is Ammonius Saocas, a 
porter at the dooks of Alexandrla. 5 The first formulations of 
Neoplatonism, however, oome to us from a pupil of Ammonius and 
the greatest exponent of that mystioal philosophy, Plotinus. 
As a philosophical system Neopla.tonism did not spring full-
blown from the head either of Ammoniu8 or Plotinus; but, with 
its elements or Platonism and Aristotelianism as well as Neo-
Pythagoreanism and Stoicism, it sho~ itself a true progeny of 
the Greek tradition of thought. The vigor and appeal of Neo-
platonism is attested to by the fact that within a short time it 
came to dominate philosophical speculation in the Mediterranean 
world. 6 
Very little is known of the personal history of Plotinus; 
praotically everything that is known cames down to us from his 
most f~ous disciple, Porphyry. The reason for this lack of 
informatIon must be attributed ohiefly to Plotinus himself, 
whose shame at being imprisoned in the body was so great, his 
biographer tells us, that he could never be induoed to relate the 
facts of his life or even to sit for a portrait painter. 7 
5Wllliam Turner, "Neop1atonism, ft Catholic Enclclopedia (New 
York, 1907-12), X, 742. 
6.wl11iam a. Inge, "Plotinus," Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(Chicago, 1939), XVIII, 81. 
7PorPhyry, Life of Plotinu8, c. 1. Porphyry's Life of 
Plotinus can be found:1n the original Greek in PlotinIiOpera, 
6 
Plotinus was born in Egypt (at Lyco or Lycopolis, according 
to the word of 1Unapius8) in either 204 or 205 A.D. He began the 
study of philosophy in Alexandria. at the age of twenty-seven. 
After experienoing dissatisfaction 14"i th the teachers he en-
countered there, he was finally introduced to Armnonius Saccas; 
a.nd after hearing him lecture Plotinus is said to have remarked: 
"This is the man I have been looking for.,,9 
Plotinus spent eleven ye8.rs ii'i lih Ammonius and made sueh pro-
gress that he conoeived a desire to investigate Persian and 
Indian thought. To fulfil his desire he joined the ill-fated 
expedition of Emperor Gordian against Persia in 242. After the 
death of Gordian Plotinus barely escaped with his own life. He 
returned to Rome around the age of forty and there established 
his sohool. In his last years Plotinus oontracted diphtheria, 
beoame hoarse, and began to lose his Sight. He retired to 
Campania, where he died in 210. 
From Prophyry's desoription of him, Plotinus was apparently 
a man 0:(' very noble oharacter. He seem.s to have made few 1:(' any 
enemies and was able to inspire trust in himself. He led an 
eds. Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolph Sohwyzer (Paris, 1951), vol. I, 
1-41. An English version may be found in Plotinu8, the Enneads, 
translated into English by Stephen HacKenna, 2nd ed.-r9vlsed by 
B. S. Page (London, [95g). . 
8 Eunapius, Lives ££ the Philosophers ~ Sophists, n. 455. 
The text referrea to is tEat In Philostratus a.nd Euna~ius, with an 
English translation by ~"'ilmer Cave ~JrIght {London, 19 2}, p. 352. 
9Porphyry, ~, c. 3. 
7 
asoetical life of oontempt for the body. He is desoribed as kind-
ly, gentle, and singularly engaging. 10 
Porphyry met Plotinus when the master was about fifty-nine 
years old. Porphyry says that by that time he had already 
written tWenty-one treatises, the rirst of which were composed 
ten years previous to their meeting. During the next six years 
Plotinus oomposed twenty-four more treatises, and in the last 
year of his life he wrote another nine. Porphyry divides the 
quality of the works according to this temporal scheme, the early 
ones manifesting less power and maturity, the middle group repre-
senting the peak of Plotinus' er.forts, and the last nine reveal ... 
11 ing a decline in mental strength. 
Plotinus personally entrusted the task of revising and 
edi ting his works to Porphyry. Porphyry says tha t Plo tinus was 
very careless in the mechanical details of composition, such as 
the joining and spelling of words. The style or the fifty-four 
treatises reflects the fact that Plotinua wrote them out quickly 
after having thoroughly worked them out in his mind. The emphasis 
is on the thought rather than the mode of expression, and 
Plotinus himself would never reread what he wrote. 12 
In editing Plotinus' work Porphyry divided the treatises 
lOIbid. , c. 2.3. 
llIbid. , c. 6. 
-
l2Ib1d• , c. 8. 
8 
topically into six groups of nine treatises, whence the title 
~nneads. Although such a grouping was bound to be somewhat 
arbitrary, the first Bnnead deals in general with ethioal ques-
tions, the second with physical questions, the third with the 
philosophical implications of the ~1Orld, the fourth with the Soul, 
the fifth with the second hypostasis (Nous), and the sixth with 
such topics as being, the Good, and free Will.13 
'l'he philosophioal synthesis which Plotinus aohieved has 
shoWn itself capable of winning enthusiastic admirers in our own 
times as well as in the third and fourth centuries. Doubtless 
much of the "popularity" of Plotinus is accounted for by the 
mystical turn which his thought takes, especially in the desire 
of the soul to return "home" in union with the One. The stress 
which he lays on the dignity of the human person and the impor-
tance of spiritual values over the merely material also attraot 
admiration and acceptance. 
An estimate of the value and ~portance of Plotinus' philoso-
phy can bes"t; be sought from recognized authori ties in the field. 
Those who seem to show excessive admiration for PlotlnuB can be 
passed over. 14 Therefore, two outstanding Plotinian SCholars 
13Ibid., cc. 24-26. 
l~E.G., see \Vil1iam R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus 
(London, 1929), I, 7-10. See also~ornas :ful t taker, The £160-
llatonists, 2nd ad. (Cambridge, Eng., 1928), p. 33, where-pfotlnus 
s styled as tithe greatest individual thinker between Aristotle 
s.nd Descartes." 
9 
whose evaluations seem moderate and well-balanced have been se-
leoted. 
Concluding a ohapter of oritioal analysis of Plotinum, Arm-
strong has this to say of the value of his philosophy: "Plotinus is 
not only the most vital oonneoting link the history of European 
philosophy, as being the philosopher 1n whom the Hellenic traditio 
in full development and maturity was brought into touoh with the 
beginnings of Christian philosophy. He is also one of the few 
ancient philosophers whom we oan still honor, though not uncritica~ 
1'1. as a master, and not simply study as a historioal curiosity-.rt15 
On the point of Plotinus t importanoe in the history of phi-
losophy Father Henry makes the following evaluation: 
Heir to the great philosophies of the anoient world, 
those of Plato, Aristotle, and the StOiCS, he borrowed 
from all of them the insights whioh he needed, but with-
out surrendering at any point the dominant influenoe ot 
Platonism. Eoleotic in appearance but powerfully unified 
by the strength of a single pervading impulse, his system 
has, by various ohannels often obsoure and indireot, oome 
to be and remained one of the guiding foroes in the 
thought of the West, whether Christian or seoular, from 
Augustine and Scotus Erigena to Dean Inge and Bergson. 
He 1s the last great philosopher of antiqUity, and yet in 
more than one respect, and notably in the stress which he 
plaoes on thelgutonomy of spirit, he is a pre ours or of 
modern times. 
15Arthur H. Armstrong, The Arch1tecture of the Intelli~1ble 
Universe in the PhilosophI or-Plot!nus (Cambr1Qge;-Eng., i9 0), 
p. 126. - - -
16paul Henry, S.J., "Plotinus' Place in the History of 
Thought," an introduction to Plotinus, the Enneads, trans. bZ 
Stephen MaoKenna, 2nd ed. revIsed by B.-s7 Page (London, T956), 
p. xxxiii. - -
10 
The subject of this thesis, then, is simply one phase of the 
highly unified system of Plotinus. After a short conspectus of 
his whole philosphy, a close examination will be undertaken ot 
his theories concerning the nature of sensible matter. 
CHAPTER II 
A CONSPECTUS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINUS 
Before a beginning can be made on the question of the nature 
of matter in Plotinus t system, it is essential that a broad out-
line of his entire philosophy be sketched. It is true of any 
metaphysic, and especially so of tha.t of Plotinu8, that one part 
involves all the others, and that anyone part can be understood 
adequately only when seen in view of the whole. 
The nature of the Enneads themselVes demands that some pre-
liminary summary of their content be made before taking up one 
particular point. Both their style and the word of porphyryl 
testify to the fact that the individual treatises were written by 
Plotinus as the result of discussions in his philosophical circle. 
The treatises were not written in any systematic order; and, as 
Brehier observes,2 anyone Ennead will take up all the problems 
of the system or, at least, will presuppose the whole system as 
already known. Thus in the four ~ 2rofesso treatises conoerning 
matter Plotinus presumes that the reader is familiar with his 
I porphyry, Life, c. 4. 
-
2Flmile Brehier, 1! phi1osophie de PIot1n (PariS, ~92~), 
p. 10. --
11 
12 
doctrine of emanation and his ethics of purification and return. 
Though Flotinus did not coin the word himself, it is oustom-
ary to oha.raoterize his metaphysics as "emanational." E:manation 
amounts to an explanation of all reality in terms of a progressive 
produotion of all levels of reality from one ultimate source. 
Plotinus calls the ultimate source the One (TO Hv). The One then 
produoes the next level of reality, which is Intelleot or Mind (6 
vou~). NOllS, in its turn, produces Soul (~ tUX~)t and Soul brings 
matter to order to produoe the material, sensible world. 
Flotinus' continual striving after higher unifioation and his 
realization of the imperfeotion of multiplic1ty led him to posit 
absolute simplicity and unity as the supreme reality in his meta-
physics. The unity of the primal hypostasis, the One, 1s such as 
to exclude the slightest shadow of duality. Not only does this 
preclude the gross multiplicity of quantitative extension, but 
even intelligenoe must not be ascribed to the One, s1nce, as 
Plotinus sees it, intelligence always involves the duality of 
knower and known. 3 
3E.G., see Enneads, III. 8. 9; VI. 7. 40; VI. 9. 6. In the 
citations from Piotinus throughout the reat of the theSis, sinoe 
the .b"'nneads will always be referred to, the ti tle will be omitted. 
The Noman numeral refers to the Ennead, the first Arabic numeral 
indicates the treatise within a p~·ticular Ennead, and the second 
Arabic numeral indicates the chapter number. When a reference is 
made to spec1£lc lines in the Greek text, the chapter number will 
be followed by a comma and then the line numbers. For hnneads 
I-III line numbers will refer to the edition of Paul Henr1 and 
Hans-Rudolph Schwyzer, Plotini Opera, Vol. I (Paris, 19S1). Line 
references in Enneads IV-VI wIll refer to the text of Emile 
13 
Almost as frequently as he calls the primal principle the 
One, Plotinu8 will refer to it as the Good (-r6.yae6v). This does 
not mean, however, that the first hypostasis is good as, for 
example, a man is good. The use of the term indicates that the 
first principle is the Absolute Good, the Good by essence.4 Even 
when the term !tthe One" is used of' the first principle, it is not 
an indication of what that principle is, but it is merely a denial 
of any mUltiPlicity.5 
The One, then, is the Unknowable, the Undefinable; and the 
only approach to a science of the One is through a "negative 
theology." Strictly speaking, no predication can be made of the 
One. Even the terms One and Good merely point out the reality of 
the first principle in the best terms available;6 and if the One 
is said to be a cause, all that this indicates 1s a dependence in 
the effect rather th~~ any modification of the One. 7 
The utter supremacy of the One is further brought out by the 
fact that it completely transcends the realm of "beings." Being 
for Plotinus, and for the general run of Greek philosophers, is 
that which is limited and determined to some particular for.m. But 
Brehiar, Enneades, Vols. IV-VI2 (Paris, 1927-38). 
4E•g., II. 9. 1; V. 5. 13; VI. 7. 38. 
5v. 5. 6. 
611 • 9. 1. 
7VI " 9 .. 3. 
the One, as the source of all forms, is itself without form and 
determination; hence, it is beyond being in the sense that it is 
not limited to being tfthis" or "that. u8 The One, then, is 
infinite and undetermined in the sense of being above nbeing," 
form, and I1mltation. 9 
The One, as has been said, is the principle from which all 
proceeds. lO Itself not a being, it produces by the infinity of 
its productive powerll the whole realm of beings, from the second 
hypostasis, Nous, on down to the last vestige of reality in the 
material universe. This production is either mediate or 
immedlate",12 
The perfection of the One results naturally in the production 
of the levels of reality beneath itself. l ) The next level below 
the One and produced directly by that first principle is the 
Bv. 5. 6. 
90r • Leo Sweeney, "Infinity in Plotinus, Part I," Gre~OrianU!,l!t 
XXXVIII (1957), 530. Together with Part II, ~., pp. 71 -732, 
this article is a good, detailed account of the notion of in-
finity in Plotinus", The author shows that Plotinus predicates in-
finity of the One,in two senses, one by negation of determination 
and form, the other in relation to the active power of the One to 
produce an infinity of beings. 
IOE.g., V. 2. 
llSes note 9 above. 
l2v. 4. 1. 
l)Ibid. 
-
15 
14-second hypostasis of the Intelligible Realm, Nous. Nous is the 
image of the One and the most perfect of beings; but, since it 
prooeeds from the One, it is necessarily of a lower degree of 
perfection. 
Whereas the One transcends the category of being, Nous is the 
first reality which is limited to a determined form and, thereby, 
to the realm of being. In fact, Plotinus says that all beings 
are contained in Nous and are even identical with Nous, since all 
the rest of reality is produced from its according to the ideas 
which it has. 15 
Though the second hypostaSis approaches as close as possible 
to the perfection and simplicity of the One, nevertheless, it is 
an essential duality. Nous is the vision of the One; and--not to 
go into all the complexities of its procession from and conversion 
toward its Prior--lt is brought to form and determined precisely 
by its vision of the One. 16 Moreover, from the vision of the One 
Nous oomes to a vision or knowledge of itselr. 17 Obviously there 
is not here the perfeot unity of the non-intellective One. nBut 
l~ous is variously translated as Intelligence, Mind, Spirit, 
Intellectual-Principle. Some commentators have compared it with 
Aristotle's First Mover as 'rhought thinking Itself. Throughout 
this thesis the second hypostasis will simply be designated by 
the English transliteration "Nous. TT 
15v. 3. 5. 
16v. 2. 1; v. 4. 2. 
17V• 3. 7; V. 6. 5. 
16 
if Intelli86nCe [.e., Nou~ is both thinker and thought, this 
implies duality and Intelligence is not simple and hence not the 
One. 1f t moreover, Intelligence contemplates some object other 
than itself, then surely there is an object better than and 
superior to it. Even if Intelligence contemplates itself and 
simultaneously that which is better than it, it still is only of 
secondary rank. nl8 
Plotinus also makes Nous the locality of Ideas (~a efOn or at 
, , ) toeal • But P10tinus makes an advance over his professed master, 
Plato, who left the Ideas hierarchically arranged but distinct 
entities. In Nous the Ideas are ~~ified into a single hypostaSis 
as the various propositions of a science form one totality.19 
There remains distinction within unity. There are ideal arche-
20 types even for individual beings, and it 1s according to these 
Ideas in Nous that all else canes to be. 
According to the degree of perfection which .it possess 
Nous also produces the next level of reality beneath it; this is 
21 
the Great Soul. Just as Nous is an image of its source, so too 
IBvI. 9. 2, 36-40. Il'rans. by Joseph Katz, The Philosophl2!.. 
Plotinus (New York, 19S0), p. 141. 
19v• 9.8. 
20V. 7. 
21 Plotinus frequently calls the third hypostasis merely Soul 
en ~uxn). He also will refer to it as the Soul of the Universe 
(~ WUx~ ~ou 8AOU). In this thesis the third hypostaSis will be 
referred to as the Great Soul to distinguish it from individual 
souls. 
17 
the Great Soul is an image of Nous. 22 The i~lianent activity of 
the Great Soul is a contemplation of' its prior principle; and in 
contemplat1nr- Nous it participates in the Ideas according to which 
it produces material realitles. 23 The Great Soul is the third and 
last hypostasis of the Intellectual Healm an'd is the intermediary 
between the intelligible a nd sensible orders. 24 
Besides its immanent activity of contemplation the Great Soul 
is also productive of its image, i~ich is the sensible universe. 25 
Having within itself the images of the Ideas of all beings, the 
Great Soul acts upon matter to bring into existence the beings of 
26 
this sensible realm. The nature of matter will, of course, be 
treated at length in the chapters to follow, but it may be noted 
here that P10tinus views material beings as tending toward non-
being. \IJhatever reality they have comes from a reflection of the 
I1eas passed along to them from the Great Soul. 
Plotinus conceives the whole emanational process as a result 
of a certain natural necessity. All levels of reality which par-
tiCipate in the reality of the One have the power to produce an 
image of themselves. Although P10tInu8 does have some diffIculty 
22V. 2. 1. 
23rv . 3. 11. 
24 Ibid.; IV. 8. 7. 
-
25IV • 8. 7. 
2611 • 3. 17. 
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in assigning a reason why the all-perfeot and oompletely self-
contained One should ever produce anything below itselt,27 he 
tries to give some explanation tor it from the analogy ot other 
beings which, upon reaohing the maturity of their perfeotion, 
28 generate offspring. This oommunication of perfection he observe 
not only 1n living beings, but to some extent even in lifeless 
entities, e.g., tire imparts warmth, ice cools, drugs produce 
their various etfects. On the other hand, the One can be said to 
produce other beings freely in the sense that it has no need of 
anything else for the plenitude ot its perfeotion. When a lower 
level of reality emanates from its souroe, this involves no change 
or diminution on the part of the souroe itself. 
In his effort to explain what he means by produotion of the 
various hypostases, Plotinus has recourse to images to illustrate 
his pOint. His favorite image for the emanational process is that 
of light radiating from the sun. 29 The One is the light illumInat-
ing the seoond hypostasis. Noue, in its turn, illuminates the 
Great Soul; and the Great Soul shines on the darkness of matter to 
produce the last level of reality in the sensible world. AgaIn, 
Plotinus compares the process to an overflowing spring. 30 He uses 
270f • Brehier, 1! philosophie ~ Plotln, p. 41. 
2Sv. 4. 1. 
29E•g ., I. 7. 1; V.I. 6; V. 3. 12. 
JOE•G., III. 8. 10; V. 2. 1. 
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other examples too, but the source is always considered to remain 
unchanged in the process. For this reason the example of radia-
tion from the sun was his favorite, since he thought that the sun 
remained undiminished in its shining forth. 
Paralleling the outward and downward movement of emanation 
in Plotinus' philosophy is an upward, returning movement of all 
reality back to its source. It would probably be a fair estimate 
to say that it is the movement of return to the One that sets the 
tone to Plotinus' philosophy, whioh is centered in man. It is by 
rising from the knowledge of himself to higher and higher unity 
that man comes to a knowledge of the Intelligible Realm to which 
he is fundamentally united.)l 
At every level of reality there is a return back upon the 
source, Nous oontemplating the One and the Great Soul contemplat-
ing Nous. P1otinus' doctrine of return is most manifest, however, 
in the return of man to his true self in union with the Intelligi-
ble PrinCiples. Individual souls, which are unified in the Great 
sou1,)2 fulfil their produotive power and produce their ~age in 
the materiel world. This is natural and necessary. But while the 
individual soul always retains some contact with the Intelligible 
Realm, it may nevertheless become forgetful of its source through 
an excessive concern with the individual body with which it is 
31V. 1. 
32E•g., IV. 3. 4. 
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joined. 33 This distraction from the Intellectual Realm and con-
cern for things of sense is the "fallt! of the soul; it can redeem 
itself only through a conversion or return toward its higher, 
intellectual phase. 
In the treatise entitled "On Dialectic,,34 Plotinus maps out 
the route whioh the BOul must take in its journey back to its 
source in the One. The first stage consists in a conversion and 
purification from the lower life of the senses and the material 
world. Once within the Intelleotual Realm the quest for higher 
unity leads the soul onward to union with the one. 35 Thus does 
the human soul join the whole of reality in a return to the 
source from which it proceeded. 
Plottnus t philosophical system, as has been seen, is a two-
fold movement, namely, the emanational pattern of production 
from a primal principle snd the ascetlcal return of the soul back 
to its source by purification and higher unification. The role 
of matter in the context of these two movements remains to be 
explained and oonstitutes the subject proper to this thesis. 
3.3rv. 3. 1$; IV. 8. 4 • 
.341. 3. 
35Plotinus conoeives this union as an ecstatic experience. 
Porphyry relates that Plotinus enjoyed this union four t~es 
during the years in which he knew the master. See Porphyry, Life, 
-c. 23. 
CHAPTE.'R III 
MATTER AS SUBSTRATUM 
In the treatise whioh he explicitly devotes to exploring the 
aature of matter Plotinus opens with a point of oommon agreement. 
tAll those," he says, "who have spoken concerning what is called 
natter (n ~An), and who have arrived at a conoeption of its nature, 
unanimously assert, that it is a certain subject and receptacle of 
"orms."l In this passage Plotinus uses two words to describe mat-
~er. He calls it a subject or substratum (~~oxe(~evov) and a re-
peptacle (~noooxn), the former being the Aristotelian term, the 
~atter the Platonic. 2 In the oourse of this chapter and the one 
~o follow, it will become clear that, while both elements are in-
volved, the notion of "substratum" 1s the chief one in the mind 
of Plotinu8, and that matter is not so much a recipient of forms 
as it is a surface, so to speak, upon which they oome and go. 
In an effort to establish the existenoe of matter in the 
sensible realm P1otinu8 closely follows the argumentation of 
III. 4. 1, 1-4. Trans. by Thomas Tarlor, Se1eot Works of 
!Plotinus, ed. G. R. S. Head (London, 1929), p. 22. 
2See Emile Brehier, Plotin, Enneades (PariS, 1924-38), II, 
56, n. 1. 
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Aristotle in the Metaphysics. 3 From observation ot the changes in 
sensible substances Aristotle concluded to a common underlying 
principle which is capable of possessing both terms of the change. 
Matter is the potentiality for that which will aotually exist 
atter change takes place; and this is true of the four types of 
change, namely, substantial, quantitative, qualitative, and looal. 
Though Plotinus restricts the use of the term "matter" more 
than Aristotle does,4 he employs the same basio argument as 
Aristotle to show that bodies (cr~aTa) have a substratum different 
trom themselves. 5 In the changes which occur in the basic ele-
ments (crTOtxeta) it is found that there is a continuity between 
the terms of the change. One element does not suddenly oease to 
be and another suddenly arise fr~u non-being. What actually 
happens is that one form (eloos) replaces another. Matter is the 
stable member whioh receives one form upon the loss of another. 
Decay, Plotinus says, is also an indication that bodies are 
compounds of matter and torm. 6 The !brce of this argument is from 
analogy. For example, a drinking vessel is reduced to its gold, 
3Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 2, 1069 b, 3-27. 
4Plotlnus uses the term "mattern to designate what would 
compare roughly with Aristotle's flrirst matter." This restricted 
use will become more evident below when the question of matter as 
potentiality is treated. cr. Brehier, Enneades, II, 74. 
5II • 4. 6. 
6Ibid• 
-
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the gold to water; water too may be ohanged into something else. 
Re then goes on to oonolude: "It is neoessary, also, that the 
elements should either be torm, or the f"irst matter, or that 
whioh oonsists of" matter and form. But it is impossible, indeed, 
that they should be form. J:i1or how, without matter, could they 
have bulk and magnitude? Nor are they the first matter; for they 
are corrupted. Henoe, they consist of matter and form. Their 
form determines them aooording to qQallty and shape; their matter 
is an indefinite subjeot, beoause it is not a fo1'm.,,7 
Onoe he haa proved the existenoe of matter as the substratum 
of forms in sensible bodies, Plotinus goes on to investigate what 
sort of thing this matter is. He does this by way of negation. 
trha fundatilental requirement of matter is that it be matter for 
all sensible beings, not 1ne1'ely for sOIlle, as olay is matter for 
the produots of the potter, but is already something in itselr. 8 
Henoe, it must be none of those things "Whioh are found in fully 
oonstituted bodies. 
Plotinus praotioally takes it for granted that matter is 
that whioh laoks all quality. "The distinotive oharacteristio of 
matter is the negation of form, sinee to laok quality is to be 
wi thout torm. ,,9 Any qualifioation that matter lllight have would 
7~., 14-19. Trans. revised from Taylor, pp. 27-28. 
811 • 4. 8. 
911 • 4. I), 23-24. See also II. 4. 8. 
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be a reflection in it of the Ideas or lOt~oi 10 of the Intellectual 
r\ealm, and this would cons ti tu te it a.s s OIlle partioular thini'::', 
But matter is precisely If}..oyoS,ll and only as suoh 1s it capable 
of providing a substratum for all sensible beings. 
'fhe first conclusion whioh Plotinus draws from the fact that 
matter laoks all cpalificatlon is that it 1s in no sense of the 
word a body. Matter itself is inoorporeal in contradistinction 
to objeots of sense perception, whioh are said to be oorporeal. 
Hateriality in this sense already implies a partioipation in the 
logoi. 12 
Since the substratum of material bodies oannot itself be a 
body, it follows that all the attributes of body must also be 
denied of matter. Hence, matter is colorless; it is neither hot 
nor cold, though it can receive either heat or coldness. Further-
more, matter cannot have any of those properties which accompany 
10 P10tinus speaks of both E foos. and AOYOS as determining 
elements of sensible bodies. The E ron are arohetypes of material 
beings and are located, in di1'terent degrees of unity, in both 
Nous and the Great Soul. The }..OYOl are, roughly speaking, pro-
duotive principles of material beings. They are also spoken of as 
existing both in Nous and the Great Soul, though most frequently 
in conneotion with the latter, since the Great Soul is the creato 
of the material universe. There are also AOYO\ a~Ep~Q~\KO(, whic 
are prinoiples of determination immanent within sensible beings. 
In this thesis Efoos (pl., Efon) will be translated as Idea 
or form. AdyoS, which is variously translated as reason, Heason-
Principle, raison formelle, will Simply be rendered by the English 
transliteration Prom the Greek, i.e., logos (pl., logoi). 
llyI. 3. 7, 8. 
12 I. II. 4.. 12. 
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quantity, such as a particular size. shape, or weibht. Quantity, 
no less than quality, is a sign of logos and Idea. 13 
Matter, then, as lacking all quality, must be utterly un-
composed and simple in itself, since composition would mean the 
presence of both a qualifying and a qualified element. Matter, 
rather, is that which is completely open to whatever comes to it; 
and whatever quality it does receive is outside of and foreign to 
matter itself. ~lhatever qualifications matter has come not from 
itself but from the forms which mould matter. 14 
A problem which seems to have held particular interest for 
Plotinu8 was the relationship of matter and magnitude (& ~lYEeOS). 
His thesis was, of course, that matter itself is without any mag-
nitude. He had to face as adversaries to this position not only 
the stoics. but also others whom Brehier conjectures to be inter-
preters or Plato's Timaeus. l5 The Stoics held that all reality is 
a body with a determined size; hence, matter too has a certain 
size. The others based their objection on Plato's concept of space 
(~ xwpa) as a receptable of qualities; they concluded that a re-
ceptacle of qualities must be of a oertain volume and have 
magnitude. 
In answer to the stoic objection that all reality is 
13 II. 4. 8. 
14Ib1d • 
............. 
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corporeal and extended, Plotinus contents himself with merely 
recalling to mind the fact that there are realities which are 
not qUantified. 16 ThoUt'!,h he does not mention pa.rticular examples 
but simply lays down the general principles that whatever is un-
embodied (aa~a~ov) lacks quantity, it is not difficult to find 
examples of such realities in his system, e.g., the hypostases 
of the intellectual Realm and, in the sensible world, the whole 
range of qualities, which even the Stoics themselves admitted 
have no magnitude. 11 But matter, he says, is &a~a~os, and so 
it has no, quantity and magnitude. 
To explain how bodies do become quantified, Plotinus dis-
tinguishes between the .form or Idea of quantity and that being 
which has quantity. '~ua.ntity (i.e., the form) is not itself 
quantlf'led, but only those things a.re quantified which participat 
18 in quantity. Just as a bein.~ becomes white through the prasenc 
of the logos of whiteness, which has no color of itself, so too 
that which gives a being a certain size has no size of itself, 
but is the logos of size or quantity.19 But does this mean that 
quantity enters into matter and extends that which was previously 
condensed? "Not at all. The matter was not contracted in a 
16 II. 4. 9. 
17Br6hier, Enneades, II, 50-51 
18 II. l.f.. 9. 
19Ibid• 
-
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small place; but principle ~hich gives forms to matte!] gives it 
a magnitude which it did not previously possess, just as it gives 
20 qualities which it had not previously possessed." 
But suppose, as Plotinus did suppose, that someone should 
ask what more is needed to constitute a body in existence beyond 
magnitude and the other bodily qualities. If the answer is that 
some substratum is needed to receive these qualifications, then 
the objeotion based on the Timaeus can be raised. This sub-
stratum, as recipient of the various bodily qualities, must be 
of a oertain size or mass (OYKO~), hence of a certain magnitude. 
Othe~se, how could it be a receptacle for for.ms? If all ex-
tension and magnitude is due to form, matter will have no 
funotion in bodies. Matter without magnitude would seem to be 
21 
a name signifying nothing. 
Plotinus begins his reply by admitting that in the ordina~ 
experience of man that which is shaped, moulded, and changed does 
have a definite mass. But he goes on to observe that such things 
as wood or gold or anything else from which various products are 
fashioned are not the matter about which he i8 talking. These 
are already entities in their own right. The case is altogether 
different with pure matter, i.e., the matter which is the 
20Ib1d., 13-15. Trans. based on the French of Brehier, 
Enneades;-II, 6). 
2111 • 4. 11. 
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substratum of all sensible beings. 
28 
It 1s not necessarily true, Plotinus observes, that volume 
or mass is essential to being a recipient. The Great Soul, for 
example, contains everything within it in an unextended unity. 
The reason why matter receives its forms in spatial extension is 
that it is the type of substratum which is capable of receiving 
extension. But it must receive its magnitude and volume, lije 
everything else it receives, from something outside itself. 
Matter, then, is merely an image or phantom (~avTaa~a) of 
mass or a primary aptness for extension; whence some bave identi-
fied matter with the void (Tb KEV6v). 
lows: 
Plotinus summarizes his doctrine on matter and mass as tol-
Hence we have something which is to be described 
not as small or great but as the great and small; for 
it is at once a mass and a thing without magnitude, in 
the sense that it is the matter on which mass is based 
and that, as it changes from great to small and small 
to great, it traverses magnitude. Its very indetermi-
nateness is a mass in the same sense--that ot being a 
reCipient of magnitude •••• 
In the order of things without mass, all that is 
Idea possesses delimitation, eaoh entity for itself, 
so that the conception of mass has no place in them; 
matter, not delimited, having in its own nature no 
stability, swept into any or every form by turn, ready 
to go here, there, and everywhere, beoomes a thing of 
multiplioity. Driven into all shapes, beooming al~3 
things, it has that muoh of the character of mass. 
23Ibid., 33-43. Trans. revised from Stephen MaoKenna, 
Plotlnus, ~he Enneads, 2nd ad. revised by B. S. Page (London, 
[9 5§) ), pp .112-13. 
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Is matter simply empty spaoe for P1otinus? One recent com-
mentator thinks so,24 but Whittaker interprets the very passages 
oonsidered above as P1otinus' argument against those who would 
25 
make matter merely the void or empty space. Plotinus himself 
remarks that the desoription of matter as "size without content" 
26 has led some to identify matter with the void. The implication 
is, however, that Plotinu8 is not one of those who have made such 
an identification. Though he insists on the unreality and non-
being of matter, as will be brought out below, his theory of 
matter as having no extension or magnitude, while at the same 
time being a potency for magnitude, seems to give it more reality 
than the nothingness of empty space. 
Early 1n his treatment of sensible matter P10tinus remarks 
that matter, because it is not a form, is the indeterminate sub-
stratum (1'0 61tol(€ (ll€VOV b:oP\O'1'ov) of the elements oomposed of 
matter and form. 27 Later on in the same treatise he takes up 
the question of the relationship between matter and infinity 
(1'0 ~1t€\pov) and indeterminateness (TO b:OP\O'TOV), and he oomes 
24Philip v. Plstorius, P10tinus and Neop1atonlsm (Cambridge, 
Eng., fI9~), p • .3. 
2~vhittaker, The Neo-Platonists, p. 70. 
--- --- ----------
2611• 4. 11, 29. "oa€V 1'\ VEe; 1'U6TOV Tep KE vi TnV flATlV E t Pl1-
KaO'\. Aristotle (Phlslos, IV, 7, 214 a, 13) makes the same ob-
servation without speoifying those about whom he is talking. 
2711 • 4. 6, 18-19. 
30 
to the conclusion that matter is infinity and indeterminateness 
28 itself. 
Plotinus establishes this conclusion by showing that infinit 
cannot be an attribute or qualification of matter entering fram 
outside. Whatever qualifies something else belongs to the order 
of the logoi and forms as a specifying and determining principle, 
and it is in itself' limited and determined. But that which is 
limited and ordered by the principles of determination is differ-
ent from those limiting principles. As that which needs to be 
brought to order and limitation, it is in itself a lack of deter-
mination. It is infinity, in the negative sense of' a lack of all 
dete~tnation. But matter is that which must be brought to order 
by the forms which it receives; and so it is infinity itself, and 
not infinite merely by reason of an attribute entering in from 
outside. "Matter, tben, must be described as infinity of itself, 
by its natural opposition to logos. Logos is logos and nothing 
else, just so, matter, opposed by its indeterminateness to logos, 
is infinity 9.J.'1.d nothing else. ,,29 
30 In a discussion o.!' the prinoiples of change in his Physics 
Aristotle opposes himself to the Platonists and distinguishes 
matter from privation (~ cr~Ep~crt~). PlotinuB undertakes to defen 
28 II. 4. 15. 
29~.,33-37. Trans. revised from MacKenna, p. 117. 
30Aristotle, PhYSiCS, I, 9. 191 b, 35 - 192 b, 6. 
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the Platonic identification of the two against the Stagirite and 
his interpreters. 3l Anyone maintaining, he says, that matter and 
privation are identified in substratum (6KOKEt~lv~) but differ in 
definition (A6y~) must be prepared to give a definition of each 
which will not include the other. 32 
Plotinus takes up the argwl~nt by stating three ways in whlc 
two definitions can be distinct from one another. ?irst of all, 
they can be altogether different, neither one involving the other 
/ But, as Brehier points out, such distinction in the definitions 
of matter and privation is not consonant with Aristotle's view in 
which matter and privation mutually involve each other. Since 
Aristotle holds that definitions refer to the essential natures 0 
things,31./- he should also hold that totally different definitions 
would involve totally different natures. 
The second way in which two definitions can be differentiate 
1s the way in which snubnose 1s differentiated from snubness, a 
familiar Aristotelian example. But this cannot be the required 
definitional distinction between matter and privation, because 
the two definitions would mutually involve each other. 
The third and last way according to which Plotinus a.llows 
3lSse Br&hier, Enn6ades, II, 52-53. 
3211 • !~. 14. 
33Brehier, Enneades, II, 53. 
34E•G., see Posterior AnalItios, II, 3, 90 b, 30. 
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that two definitions can be distinct is a distinction in which 
only one definition involves the other, as, for example, the 
definition of fire involves the concept of heat but the def1nitio 
of heat does not involve the concept of fire. This, however, is 
the distinction of a form from. the subject 1n which it is found. 
If privation is merely a form under which matter appears, there 
35 
can be no identifying them in substratum. 
The conclusion to be drawn frOll1 this argUlnentation,36 though 
Plotinus does not draw it 1n so many words, is that, since com-
pletely distinct definitions of matter and privation cannot be 
given which will be consistent wth identifying them in sUb-
stratum, there is no distinction at all between matter and pri-
vation. PlotinuB clearly affirms that matter is identified with 
privation,37 which is "neither a quality nor a qualified entity; 
it is the absence of quality or of anything else, as noiseless-
ness is the absence of noise and so on. A privation is a 
negation. tt38 
Why was Plotinus so anxious to insist upon a complete identi 
fication of privation and matter? The reason is not altogether 
3511• 4. 14. 
36The line of Plotinus' argument has been filled out here 
with the aid of Br&hier, Enn'ades, II, 53. 
37I1 • 4 .• 14. See also II. 4. 16, 3-4. 
38II • L~. 13, 20-23. 
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clear, but some considerations do present themselves. As will be 
brought out at greater length below, Plotinu5 insists upon the 
negative aspects of matter, calling it non-being, utter destitu-
tion, and essential lack of all qualification. If matter is 
simply absence of form and quality, and if privation is de.fined 
in the same tenlls, their complete identification in Plotinus t 
philosophy becomes more consistent, at least within his ow.n syste 
Furthermore, the beings of the Intellectual Realm, though graded 
on different levels, are completely determined and perfect in 
themselves; hence, they are not deprived of anything. As far as 
the present author has been able to observe, Plotinus speaks of 
privation only in connection with the beings of the sensible 
realm; the individual human soul, which is in contact with both 
worlds, suffers privation and evil only to the extent to which it 
is involved with matter. 
A recurring theme in Plotinus t treatment of matter is the 
completely negative status which he assigns it in the hierarchy 
of existents. Matter is altogether outside the realm of being; 
it is the non-being (TO ~~ ov). This non-entitative aspect of 
-
matter is particularly insisted upon when Plotinus takes up the 
question of evil, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter of this 
thesis. He is hardly less inSistent, however, when dealing with 
matter as the substratum of sensible bodies. 
IItrhe distinctive character of' matter, then, 
than its very essence. This character is not ac 
consists rather in a relation to other things, the relation of be-
ing other tl~ they.n 39 Plotinus goes on to add that everything 
except matter has not only the relationship of being "other" than 
everything else, but that it is also its own form and is an entity 
in ltsel.f. Matter is sim.ply the nothern and has no entity of its 
own, since it has no form of its own. Plotinus even adds that it 
would be better to call matter the "others,n since the sin.gular 
40 form might imply a certain determination even in its otherness. 
It is clear, as Plotinus notes,4.l that lnatter cannot simply 
be identified with alterlty or otherness en l~Ep6~~~). Any in-
dividual entity will be different from or "other thann every other 
entity. But matter is identified with that aspect of alterity· 
which stands in opposition to authentic beings. In other words, 
matter is that which is opposed to or is "other than" being. It 
is in this precise aspect that matter is identified with priva-
tion, since privation too is that which is opposed to the true 
beings. 
Matter, then, as is evident from the foregolng consideration 
and as Plotinus clearly states,42 1s essentially relational. AS 
a substratum, it neaessarily implies a relation to that which 1s 
391I • 4. 13, 20-28. Trans. revised from MacKenna, p. 114. 
t~o1I. 4. 13. 
411I• 4.. 16. 
Lt2V1. 1. 27, 28. 
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not a substratum but is external to it and aeta upon it to bring 
it to form and order. In other words, matter is the potential (~C 
Ouvap.Et), and in the treatise "On Potential and Actual Being.,43 
Plotinus takes up the question in SOIne detail. 
Berore categorizing matter as the potential, Plotinus very 
carefully distinguishes the meaning of the tenns the potential 
(~O Ouvap.Et), the actual (TO ~VEpyE(~), potency (~ Ouvap.ts), and 
act (~ ~vlpYEta). 
Being in potency cannot be independent of that to tvhich it 
is in potency. Bronze, for example, is potential to the finished 
statue. But if it were simply bronze, incapable of any further 
modification or change, it would Simply be itself and in no sense 
potential. The potential, therefore, signifies that a being is 
already. in a sensa, something other than itself, since it can 
become something e18e. 44 
Now there are two possible :ays in which a potential being 
can be actualized; either the being in potency will remain after 
the change what it was before, as when a statue is fashioned out 
of bronze, or it will be entirely changed in the process, as air 
is changed when it becomes fire--to use Plotinus' example. In 
the first case, tae being in act is not entirely different f'rom 
the being in potency, but consists in the addition of a. forl1l to 
L~3II. 5. 
4411 • 5. 1. 
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the being in potency. In the second oase the being In act is al-
together different from the being in potency.45 
Briefly, then, ~ 20tential or being in potency is the ~­
stratum of the various modifications, shapes, &nQ i'orms which it 
can receive. ~ actual or being in act is the composite of a 
form and the sUbstratum. Potencl, as Plotinus employs the term, 
refers to the productive force which brings a potential being to 
actualization, while!.£! is the form of a. particular beinE, which 
makes that being exist in act and no longer in potency.46 
In which of these categories will matter fall? As Brehier 
remarks,47 it is not easy for flotinus to fit his concept of mat-
ter into categories which were not made for it. All beinss which 
exist in potency to somethinf~ else also exist as beings in act in 
their own right. But matter is precisely that which underlies 
all sensible beings and is in potency to them all. It follows, 
then, that matter is in itself nothing actual at all; it is non-
being. No objection to this conclusion can prevail, since matter 
cannot be any sensible being--these are founded upon nEt t'ter--nor 
can it belong to the realrli of forms. since it is utterly formless. 
Failing on both these counts to be classified among true beings, 
1.t.5II • 5. I &. 2. 
1~.6Ibid. 
1.t.7Brehier, Enn~adeB, II, 7L~. 
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it is all the more emphatically non-being. 48 
Matter, then, can be considered as the purely potential. 
Unlike all other beings in potency, matter is nothing actual of 
itself; otherwise it would be matter merely in the limited sense 
in which bronze is the matter of a statue. The existence of 
matter is merely the existence of what is to become. l~iorel'}veI', 
the potentiality and non-being of matter is comparable to the 
potentiality of bronze under change, 1.e., Just as bronze remains 
bronze after becoming a statue, so ulatter remains simply matter, 
and, as such, retains its utter potentiality and its status as 
non-being. IIBut matter is outside and apart from being. It can-
not change, and so it remains forever waat it always was; that i8, 
it is forever non-being_,,49 
The non~entitative status of matter lies at the heart of 
Plotinus t theory of matter considered both as substratum of 
sensible beings and, as will be seen, as the principle of evil. 
He 1s capable of waxine eloquent on the point, and his own words 
will serve to emphasize his doctrine. 
It ffiIattef) is a sort of feeble and obscure image 
which cannot assume any form. Matter thus has the 
actuality. of a phantom (efbooAov), the actuality of an 
illusion ~it., a lie--To weubo~ It is illusion in the 
48 4 II. 5. .. 
4911 • 5. 5, 11-13. Trans. revised trom Katz, ~ PhilosophI 
of Plotinus, p. 133. The unchangeableness of matter will be 
taken up at greater length in the following ohapter. 
absolute sense of the term and thus that which is not 
real. If matter then is actual non-being, non-being 
preeminently, that which really is not real, it is far 
removed from being an actual thing; for non-belng is 
its real nature. If it exists at all, it must not be 
an actual thing, but, f~~ from real being, must have 
its being in not be1ng.~O 
The question arises here and demands some sort of answer as 
to what Plotinus means when he says that matter is non-being. 
Does he mean to deprive matter of every vestige of reality and 
make it equivalent to pure nothing? Or is there some positive 
element of exis tenca left to matter, e van though it stands out-
side the realm of beings? 
Any answer to this question will have to take into consider-
ation what Plotinus understands by being. First of all, it shoul 
be clear from a consideration of the whole philosophy of Plotinus 
that being 1s not transoendental; not everything that exists 1s 
ipso f aoto a being. The One oertainly is something real for 
Plotinus, but it is not a "being. u51 Plotinus Is clearly within 
the Greek tradition of thought. For the Greeks "beingtl is th.at 
whioh is Itmited, determined, fonned, it is that whlch is in-
telligible. and they had no conception of an infinite intel1eot 
capable of comprehending an infinite being. 52 
5°11. 5. 5, 21-27. Trans. by Katz, p. 133. 
Slsee Chapter II, pp. 13-14. See also V. 2. 1. 
52For P1otinus' words on "being" as that whlch Is limited 
and deternlined see V. 1. 7, 19-26. 
39 
The One. then, is non-being is the sense of something greate 
than or beyond being. It is precisely because it is no particula 
being that it can beget all beings. 53 Now matter, too, is non-
being) but obviously it is not non-being in the same way that the 
One is. It is non-being because it is formless, unlimited, un-
determined; but it is not that which is beyond limitation and 
being, but that whioh is lacking limitation and for.m. It is belo 
being. But can it be that matter exists even though it is not a 
being, just as the One e~sts but is not a being? 
In the opinion of the present author Plotinus does want to 
preserve that much of a positive element in the non-entity.jf 
matter. The wnole tone of his discussion of matter seems to 
militate against making matter simply nothing. Even though. he 
SRYS that matter is tfnothing in itself,tt 54 the context indicates 
that he.means nothing of actual being or nothing in aot. If mat-
ter is in potency for everything B...l'ld is truly a substrat'UlJ1, it 
seems hard to conceive of this as purely nothing. 
SOMe indications that Plotinus did not wish to remove all 
existence from the ultimate substratum can be found in his text. 5 
53v. 2. 1. 
5411 • 5. 5, 5-6. , QU1'O. 
55The indications are even clearer when Plotinus treats of 
evil as non-being. This will be brought out in Chapter V. 
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In a passage which has already been conSidered,56 P10tinus asks 
whether or not matter is simpl.,. the same as tfotherness" or 
alterity. Hie answer is that it is the same as that part ot 
alterity which is opposed to true being. "In this sense,ff he 
says, "the non-being has a certain measure of being. n57 Again, 
in the passage cited above58 where Plotinus is describing the 
non-being ot: matter, he speaks of it as a "feeble and obsoul'e 
image," "the aotuality of a phantom," an "illusion," having "its 
being in non-being." Allot these modes of expression point to 
the fact that for P1otinu8 the non-being of matter is not the 
non-being of absolute and unqualit:ied non-existence. 
If matter is non-being and it: only beings, as possessing 
form and determination, are knowable, the question arises as to 
how matter ever comes to be known. The answer is that matter is 
known only through the intelleot by means of a reasoning process 
(AOY tall-CiS) • 
Certainly matter is unknowable to the sense faoulties. "For 
it is not perceived by the eyes, since it is without color. Nor 
by the hearing; tor it bas no sound. Nor by the smell, or the 
taste; tor it has neither moisture, nor vapor. Is it, theret:ore, 
percei.ved by the touch? Certainly not, because it is not a. 
$6See p. 34. 
571I. 4. 16, 3. 
58see pp. 37-38. 
H ov. 
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body.n59 Plotinus goes on to conclude that it is known only by 
reasoning, and this reasoning process, he says, is not intel-
lectual (OOK tK vou); it is empty (xeveS). 
This last statement, that the prooess of knowing matter 1s 
not ot the intellect, must be balanoed against P1otinus' state-
ment earlier in the same treatise where he affirms that it is the 
intelleot whioh knows the constituents, i.e. matter and form, or 
oompound beings. 60 The intellect is oapable of analyzing com-
pound beings into their elements. The 1e:st element in bodies is 
matter; and this the intellect affirms as a sort of impenetrable 
darkness devoid of form and of the illumination which is in be-
ings as a result of form. 
To give a further explanation of the knowledge ot matter,6l 
Plotinus has recourse to the «spurious reasoning" (veeos ).,0"( H1P.eS ) 
of Platots Timaeus. Since matter is the indeterminate, it oan 
only be known through an indeterminate knowledge. It is achieved 
not so muoh through an act of the intellect (voncrts) as by a 
negation of this act. 62 
The indetermination of the soul in this "spurious reasoning" 
is not complete ignoranoe and absence of knowledge. There is a 
59I1 • 1.1 .• 12, 28-31. Trans. revised from Taylor, p. 37. 
6°11. 4 .• 5. 
61 II. 4. 10. 
62This is what P10tinus has in mind when he said that matter 
positive element to this indetermination, much like the awareness 
that the eye haa of darkness. In knowing matter the soul puts 
aside all sensible forms, which correspond to light; and what 18 
left is a residue which it cannot bring to determination. There 
is, then, a quasi vision of shapelessness, colorlessness, aize-
1esaness. This vision of matter is not the same as having no 
understanding Whatsoever; in the latter case there is no affirma-
tion or experience, whereas in the knowledge of matter there is 
the impression or experience of the formless. 63 
In view of the overwhelmingly negative treatment which 
Plotinus gives to matter, some question may arise as to what part 
matter as a substratum plays in the emanational scheme. A brief 
consideration of the necessity of matter will give evidence of 
the essential role it plays in Plotinus t philosophy. 
"lrJhatever may be the place of liberty in Plotinus' thought, 
the message of his text is that the emanational process proceeds 
by way of necessity.64 Each level of being that has productive 
potency must give rise to the next level below;65 and if there 
is something after the First, the enmnational process will 
is known by a non-intellectual, empty reasoning process. 
63 4 II. • 10. 
64see Chapter II, pp. 17-18. 
65IV • 8. 6. 
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necessarily arrive at a last. Thus matter is a necessary ele-
ment in the emanational process. It stands as the outer limit to 
which the energy of being can reach. 
I·lore specifically, the Great Soul receives its being and 
perfection fronl Nous, but in a less tight-knit unity, since it is 
another step removed from the perfect uni ty oJ' the One. Since 
the Great Soul also has its communicable perfection, "it must un-
fold from some unified principle as from a seed, and so advance 
to its term. in the sense world.,,67 
In answer to the question which he poses to himself on the 
way in which the Great Soul comes to its intercourse with the 
sensible world, Plotinus notes that without the existence of 
bodies the Great Soul could not have gone forth in accord with 
the law of emanation. 68 This does not mean that bodies ever 
existed apart from soul or that matter "vas ever entirely devoid 
of order. It simply means that the Great Soul engendered a place 
for itself by producing bodies. Plotinus describes this produc-
tion of the sensible world in the following terms: tiThe Great 
Soul ••• , as a hugh illumination pouring outwards, comes at last 
to the extreme bourne of its light and dwindles to darkness; this 
darlrness, now lying there beneath, the Great Soul sees and by 
66See I. 8. 7. 
67IV • 8. 6, 8-10. Trans. revised from Mac Kenna, p. 362. 
68rv • 3. 9. 
seeing brings to shape; for in the law of things this ultimate 
depth, neighboring with Soul, may not go void of whatsoever de-
gree of logos it can absorb.,,69 
'fhe necessity of bodies and the sensible universe in the 
emanational process involves with it the necessity of matter, be-
cause matter is required for the existence of' bodies. If there 
were no such thing as matter to be a substratu.rn f'or the Idea-f'orm 
of bodies, the Idea-forms would &mply remain united in the Great 
~~oul. l"urtherrnore, rna tter is thf.7 basis for the unity in beings 
composed of several forms. 70 
In connection with the neoessary existence of matter, the 
interesting and philosophically relevant question of the origin 
of rna tter can be raised. I.r all reality and goodness ultimately 
come i'rom the One, where does mat ter as the total absence of be-
lng and goodness come from? 
In one of the very few places in which he even touches on 
this question Plotinus gives us a choice. Either matter is 
eternal, or it is a necessary consequence of the causes prior to 
it.7l This disjunction of eternal matter and caused matter hard-
ly seems pertinent, since PlotinuB clearly ~old8 an eternal 
69Tbid., 24-28. Trans. revised from MacKenna, p.268. 
-
7°11. 4. 12. 
71rV. 8. 6. 
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emanation of the universa. 72 trhe sense ot' the disjunction, then, 
is probably that the .former meniher implies tha t matter is a 
principle uncaused by the emanational process, while the latter 
member stands for matter as a caused principle. 73 
If matter is eternal, Plotinus says, the very fact of its 
0xistance renders it impossible for it not to have some share in 
the principle of good, which cO!Dmunicates i tselt' to everything in 
tho measure in w~ich each can receive that co:rnmunication. On the 
other hand, if matter follows from the causes which precede it, 
then it is necessarily bound up with the principle which gave it 
eXistence. 74 This principle would, of course, ultimately be the 
One. Plotinus himself makes no choice between these tw·o alter--
natives, but he is careful to avoid a total break between matter 
and the source of being, regardless of which choice is made. In 
this way he avoids any radical dualism in his philosophy. 
On this pOint a difference may be noted in the opinions of 
two corrunentators on Plotinus. £listorius, attending to the nega-
tive aspect of matter as non-beine, denies that it is created 
either in time or from eternity.75 How, he asl'.:s, can that which 
is not be created? Dean Inge, on the other hand, interprets 
72See III. 2. 1. 
73cr . 3rehier, ~ philosoEhie ~ Plotin, p. 206. 
74rv • 8. 6. 
75pistorius, Plotinus a.nd NeoElatonisrn, pp. 68, 70. 
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Plotlnus as holding that matter is created, though not in ttme. 76 
Inge, however, is not thinking of creation in the Christian sense 
of !2i nihilo. Such a concept, he feels. has no meaning when th.e 
question is of eternal creation.. Eternal creation Signifies only 
a relation of dependence on the creator. 
It is not at all obvious what Plotinu8 himself wiehes to hoI 
on the subject. If matter is the same as "nothing,~! t.hen there 
is no problem and Pistorius is certainly correct. On the other 
hand. if there is any positive element or reality to matter, then 
from the point of view of preservine a monistic philosophy, as 
PlotinuB seems to want to do, he olieht to h&.ve matter proceed 
somehoW' from the First Principle; ucain from the point of vieH of 
the total opposition of matter and true being he ourht to main-
tain a radical distinction between the substratum of the sonsible 
world and the productive hypostases of' the Intellectual Pealm. 
Pistorius, it may be said, overlooks the possibility that 
matter is more than mere nothing. Inge, accordine to Pistorius t 
criticism of his interpretation,77 apparently confuses Ir.atter 
with the sensible universe. 
The nature of matter as the substratum for sensible bodies 
has been considered. The non-entitative status of this sub-
76Inge • ~ Phi1osoph.y 2! Plotinus, I, 143-44. 
77P1storius, Plotinu8 ~ £eo~latoniwn, p. 68. 
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stratum, as well as the necessity of it in Plotinus' total meta-
physic and the manner in which it is known, have also been 
treated. In the following chapter a closer stuuy will be made of 
a peculiarly Plotinian view of matter, namely, its absolute 
impassivity and oonstancy in the changes which bodies undergo. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE IMPASSIVITY OF MATTER 
Reference has already been madel to the fact that Plotinus 
views matter as a changeless constant, totally unaffected by the 
comings and goings of various forms which enter into the con-
stitution of bodies. A very clear instance of this occurs in the 
last chapter of the treatise "On Matter," in which Plotinus 
affirms the identification of matter and privation. 2 To the 
objection that privation and indetermination must cease to exist 
when the absent form is at last present, he merely replies that 
form and determination, far from destroying privation and in-
determination, actually confirm that native state. Plotinus 
finds analogous situations in sowing, which brings out the 
natural quality of the land, or fecundation, which makes the 
female more deeided1y female. 3 
I Chapter III, p. 37. 
2 II. 4. 16. 
3As Brehier notes (Enneades, II, 55), this is hardly an 
answer to the Aristotelian position that privation ceases to 
exist after change takes pla.ce. The answer simply shows the 
radieal difference between the thought of Aristotle and 
Plotinns. 
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In a treatise entitled "The Impassivity of the unembodied,,,4 
chronologically later than II. 4, Plotinus takes up the question 
again and at much greater length. The purpose of the treatise is 
to show that whatever is not a body cannot undergo any change. 
The first five chapters are devoted to showlng that individual 
souls remain unchanged despite the activities in which they en-
gage and the passions to which they are subject in oonjunction 
with their bodies. The last fourteen chapters of the treatise 
undertake to show that matter, incorporeal in its own fashion, is 
an impassive substratum, unmoved, as it were, by the changes whic 
take place in bodies. 
Plotinus lays the foundation of his doctring of an impassive 
substratum on the non-entitative status of matter. He prefaoes 
his discussion of the question by pointing out the unreality of 
the sensible universe--the more bodily, massive, and inert a 
thing is, the further removed it is from the life and mcvemsnt of 
the true beings of the intellectual Realm--and reiterating the 
profound opposition between matter and be1ng.5 His doctrine here 
is a restatement of what has already been considered concerning 
the non-being of matter. 
Since the very nature of' matter is to be other than true be-
ing, it can maintain itself only by being closed (aO€KTov) to any 
4111 • 6. 
5 III. 6. 6 & 7. 
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assimilation of being or even an image of being. Only thus can it 
maintain its oomplete !lothemess tl to all being; once it were 
united with any form, it would cease to be matter, the all recep-
tive. nIt Is neoessary, however, that matter should remain the 
same, While forms enter into it, and that it should be impassive 
during their egress from it, in order that they may always enter 
into and depart from it.,,6 
The necessity of the impassivity of matter oan be further 
demonstrated by a oonsideration whioh Plotinus evidently borrowed 
from Aristotle. In the Q! Generatione ~ Corruptione Aristotle 
shows that only oontraries, whIch are generically "like" and 
speoifically "unlike," are mutually related as agent and patient 
in change. 7 Thus, as both Plotinus and Aristotle note, that which 
is hot 1$ changed by that which is cold. Another ex:ample of' change 
between oontraries, Plotinu8 points out,8 is a fire burning out 
and ohanging into another element. It is the fire which has 
o hanged; one would not say that matter burned out or ohanged. 
The oonclusion which Plotlnus draws f'rom this is that there is 
passivity and changeableness only where corruption is possible 
through the interaction of contraries. But, he says, it is 
impossible for matter to oorrupt, since there is nothing into 
61II • 6. 13, 29-31. Trans. by Taylor, p. 103. 
7Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr., I, 7. 323 b, 16 - 324 a, 9. 
See Brehie~, F~neiQea;-IIY; ~ n. 1 
8 III. 6. 8. 
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which it can change. The idea here seems to be that if matter 
changed into anything, it would have to become 80me particular 
being and thereby cease to be matter. 9 
It may strike us as amazing, Plotinus remark8,10 that matter 
remains impassive despite the presence of various forms which come 
and go. The answer ls, though, that the forms expel one another; 
and so it is the composite of matter and tor.m which is affected by 
change, while matter alone remains unatfected. "Matter does not 
increase in its composltion with an approaching torm; it does not 
then become what it is through the approach ot torm, nor does it 
decrease with its departure. Matter remains what it was from the 
beginning. nll 
Plot1nu8 was well aware that an entirely impassive matter 
would not be congenial to everyone's philosophical thought; 
Aristotle 1n particular canes to mind. 12 It would seem, Plotinus 
says by way of objection to his own pOSition, that matter is 
necessarily aftected by the changes that take place in bodies, 
since it is the receptacle for qualities which interact upon one 
another. Natter is caught up in the middle of all this activity 
as being the ground for the various qualities. Furthermore, it 
cannot be said that gmtter is separate trom qualities, since it is 
9 Cf. III. 6. 10. 
10111. 6. 11. 
11Ibid., 1$-18. Trans. based on Brehier, Enn'ades, III, 109. 
l2Cf • Breh1er, Enneades, III, 92. 
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their substratum. But whatever is present to a substratum imparts 
to it some thing of 1 tself • 13 
Plotinus undertakes to &nswer this objection which he pro-
poses to himself by distinguishing two general ways in which one 
thing can be present to another. 14 In one type of presence one 
thing changes the other to which it is present, as is especially 
true in the oase of living beings. Though Plotinu8 does not 
elaborate the pOint, it may be assumed that he had in mind such 
changes as growth, disease, and death, which are effected in an 
animal through some qualifying "presence. n 
The second type of presence which Plotinus claims to tind 
1s, of course, that in which the subject is not ohanged by the 
presence of something else. An example of this latter type of 
presence can be found in the impassivity of the individual soul, 
whioh, Plotinus says, remains essentially unchanged for all its 
15 
acts of knowledge and desire. Other examples of this type of 
presence are deSigns in wax, light on an illuminated object, cold-
ness in a stone, color in a line or surfaoe. The point which 
Plotinus 1s bringing out in these examples is that the subject of 
these various mod1fioations remains what it was; 1.e., wax remains 
13111. 6. 8. 
14111. 6. 9. 
15The f1rst part of the treatise "On the Impassivity of the 
Unembodiedtl was devoted to establishing this pOint. 
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wax, stone remains stone, etc. This latter type of presence is 
the type of presence which is claimed for qualities in matter. 
The substratum or subject remains what it is for all the changes 
which occur, as it were, on its surface. 
One may well wonder whether this distinction which Plotinu8 
makes between types of presence really answers the difficulty_ 
At best it has the air of an ~~ distinction, and it may well 
be doubted that Aristotle would accept the examples offered as 
proving the point. The wax and stone certainly remain wax and 
stone, but not in the altogether unqualified sense which PlotinuB 
wants to hold for his impassive matter. Logically Plotinus must 
hold that matter is altogether impassive, once he has established 
it as non-being. It appears to the present author, however, that 
he would make a much better defense of his doctrine if he would 
appeal exclusively to the unique character of matter as non-being 
instead of trying to compare it with other types of substrata. 
Ultimately, it seems, he is going to have to hold, at least in 
principle, that matter is a substratmn which is "outside of" or 
It apart from" its qualifying forms .. 16 
Plotinus moves on to another consideration which provides a 
l6SuOh "separation" of substratum and forms seems to be 
~plied in III. 6 .. 9, 37-44. It should be noted that III. 6. 9 
is an answer to an objection in III. 6. 8, 12-20, part of which 
implies that a substratum oannot exist "apart from" (l~ru) its 
qualifying for.ms. This point will be discussed again below in a 
brief evaluation of Plotlnus' ooncept of an impassive matter. 
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more constructive answer to the Aristotelian objection and one 
whieh is more pertinent to his own doctrine on matter. Again 
Plotinus has recourse to the thought of Aristotle that only con-
traries act on one another, and that qualities which are simply 
different leave each other una.ffected. "But things which do not 
have a contrary cannot undergo the effects of a contrary.nl7 But 
matter, Plotinus leaves us to inter, hac no contrary.18 The con-
clusion ot this reasoning is: 
Hence it is necessary that, if anything suffers, it should 
not be matter, but something which is a composite of mat-
ter and form, or, in short, that it should be at one and 
the same time many things. But that which is alone and 
separate from other things and which is entirely simple 
will be impassive to all things, even if it is caught up 
in the midst of their interaction on each other. • • • 
Granted that there is a mutual interaction according to 
the natures of those things which come together in matter; 
matter itself, however, is muoh more impassive than such 
qualities in 1t, which, it th~y are not contraries, are 
unaffected by each other.19 
Plotinus' interest in the problem of matter and magnitude has 
been discussed above. 20 He returns to the question here because 
one of the reasons why matter is thought to be passive is that it 
17111. 6. 9, 34-3$. 
107-108. 
/ . / Trans. based on Brehier, Enneades, III, 
l8In the treatise "On the Nature and Souroe ot Evi1sTf (I. 8) 
Plotinus explicitly states that matter as essential evil is the 
oontrary of the Good or the One. A comparison of these two views 
will be taken up in Chapter V. 
19111 • 6. 9, 35-44. Trans. revised trom Taylor, p. 96. Cf. 
also III. 6. 19. 
20Chapter III, pp. 25-28. 
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i8 thought to be an extended magnitude capable of division into 
various parts.2l Plotinus reiterates the same teaohing in this 
treatise22 as he proposed in II. 4, n~ely, that matter of itself 
is unextended but takes on the appearance of extension through 
oontact with the Idea or logos of magnitude. 
Onee it is admitted that matter Is essentially devoid of 
extension, then it is easy for Plotinu8 to explain how matter re-
mains tmpasslve under various ohanges in the magnitude of bod1eB.~ 
Magnitude is simply an imaging on matter of the Ideal-magnitude 
and pertains to the oomposite of matter and form rather than to 
matter alone. ConSider, for example, the magnitude of a man or a 
horse. When the man or horse oease to exist, their magnitudes 
also cease to exist. What remains oonstant is the magnitude of 
mass in general, whioh is manifested in various bodies at various 
ttmes. Magnitude, then, 1s one of the components of bodies, in-
deed, it 1s implied in the very notion of a body. But matter, 
sinoe it 1s certainly not a body, has nothing to do with magnitude 
and is totally unaffected by dtmensional variations of bodies. 
ttMa tter preserves its na ture; magnitude is only a garment whioh it 
wears because it must follow magnitude wherever the latter's 
oourse leads it. But if that in which it is clothed were to with-
2lcr. Brehier, Enneades, III, 93. 
22III. 6. 16-18. 
2.3III. 6. 16. 
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d~aw, it would ~emaln what it 1s in itself. Matte~ has only that 
magnitude which the fo~m present in it gives to it.,,24 
Another problem which gives some trouble to Plotinue in 
maintaining an enti~ely impassive matter is that of matter's 
pa~tieipat1on in the Ideas. He evidently feels that Plato held 
some sort of partioipation when he speaks in the Timaeus of the 
images of real existenoes passing in and out of space.25 The 
t~ouble is that the ordinary notion of partioipation involves 
change or passivity on the part of the participating subjeot. 
Plotinus attempts to solve this diffioulty by devising a typ 
of partioipation which does not involve passivity; but he~e agaIn 
his solution seems a bit weak. 26 He says that matta~ts participa-
tion in the Good is not an authentic partioipation, but one which 
is adapted to the nature of matter, leaving it unchanged; any t~u. 
partio1patlon In the Good and in the Ideas would be dest~uotlve ot 
the formless and non-entitative status of matte~. What the solu-
tion amounts to, it would seem, is that Plotinus t~ies to preserve 
the name ot pa~tioipation for matter--out ot ~espect for Plato?--
and at the same time to deny the fact. 
Later on in the same treatise PlotinuB once more takes up the 
24Ibld., 19-23. T~ans. based on B~'hier, Enneades, III, 120. 
-
25Plato, Timaeue, 50 c, 4-5. 
26111. 6. 11. 
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problems or partioipation. 27 He asks himself how matter, as the 
non-partioipant, oan participate in being. This time his answer 
is more positive, but it may well be doubted that what he de~ 
scribes 1s really any sort of participation. Matter participates 
in being, he says, by flinging baok all that oomes to it, just as 
an eoho is :f'lung baok from a sounding surface. Because the s~ 
faoe oannot absorb the sound and really receive it into itself, 
it flings it baok as an eoho; this is what matter does with the 
images that oome to it from the Ideas and the logoi. "Matter re-
mains as it was, taking nothing to itself; it is the oheok to the 
emanation & belnS]; it is a ground that repels .1128 
Plotinus' dootrine on the impassivity or matter seems to 
admit, at least logioally, of several oorollaries whlch serve to 
bring into relief the differenoe of Plotinian matter from Aristo-
telian--and Soholastio--matter. Although Plotinus olearly states 
that matter was never without tona29 or was never unordered,)O 
and, furthermore, that the basic elements of the sensible universe 
are composites of matter and form,)1 it would seem that this 1s 
merely a ~ facto situation, not ~ jure. Beoause the produotion 
27111. 6. 14. 
28Ibid• , 29-30. Trans. revised from MaoKenna, p. 217. 
-
29II. 4. 3, 14-15. 
3Orv. 3. 9, 17. 
3111. 4. 5, 2-4; II. 4. 6, 14-19. 
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of the cosmos is from eternity, as has bean noted above,32 there 
simply never was a time when matter and form were not conjoined. 
But 1i' matter is altogether unaffected, changeless, and constant 
despite the variations of the images reflected upon it, there 
would seem to be nothing in the nature of matter to prevent its 
existing without any forms. Plotinus would probably reply that, 
in the emanational pattern, matter exists only to be the ground or 
substratum for bodies; if bodies did not eXist, matter would not 
exist either. This would undoubtedly be consistent With his over-
all view of emanation, but an altogether impassive u~tter does 
leave the impression that it possesses an independenoe of its own. 
Another corOllary of the impassivity of matter 1s that matter 
and form do not unite into a Single, substantial oompound. Ploti-
nus notes with approval that Plato held this preoise position,33 
and the ways in which he himself speaks about bodies clearly in-
dicate that such is his own view too. 34 Matter beoomes merely a 
condition for the existence of bodies. If the Ideas and logo! are 
not to remain in a unified state in Nous and the Great Soul, they 
320hapter III, pp. 44-45. 
33111. 6. 12, 1-4. 
34Bodies, he says, are images of the Ideas in matter, c~mpar­
able to reflections in a mirror. Or again, matter reflects back 
the forms that come to it like an echoing surface reflects back 
sounds. Plotinus t imagery conoerning matter will be further oon-
sidered in Chapter VI. 
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must be received in a substratum which is ap t for extension. 35 
Thus matter does not enter into a body as an intrinsic cause; the 
radical difference in the nature of matter and form prevent their 
intermingling. 36 One may even wonder whether there is any point 
in looking for intrinsic causes in bodies as Plotinus sees them, 
since they do not seem to be true beings in any case. 
It is clear from the discussion thus far that Plot1nus views 
matter as the substratum of the material universe. Furthermore, 
this substratum is simply the inert and impassive ground onwhieh 
the images of the Ideas come and go. Natter can be said to be a 
receptacle for these image-forms in the sense that the forms are 
reflected on it; but it is not a receptacle in the sense that it 
truly harbors the forms within itself or enters into composition 
with them. 
35111 • 6. 18. 
36111. 6. 15. 
CHJ.\.PTEH V 
MATTER AS PRINCIPLE OF ~VIL 
Not long berore he died Plotinus wrote and dispatched to 
Porphyry a group of four treatises which proved to be his last. 
Among these, chronologically listed as the fifty-first, was the 
treatise which is to be considered in this chapter, namely, "On 
the Nature and Souroe of Evils. 1f Conoerning these last four 
treatises, Porphyry remarks that they show the effects of 
Plotinus 1 dec1in1ng powers and that there is a noticeable dif-
ference in them from a group of five treatises wh1ch had been 
wr1tten not much ear11er.1 
Though the powers of Plot1nu8 may well have been declining 
when he wrote the treatise on evil, the style and method of 
approaoh is that of the Plotinus of earlier years. Furthermore, 
the thought of this present treatise, in wh1ch he descr1bes mat-
ter as the absolute, essential evil and the source of all derived 
ev1ls, is merely an elaboration of elements contained in his pre-
vious work. In one of his very first treatises he wrote that the 
ugliness of the soul is due to its "inclination towards body and 
lpOl'phyry, 1!!.! £!. _P .... l_o_t .... 1n_us_, c. 6. 
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lootter. 1t2 In another of hie early works he states that the evil 
in this world is a condition of matter or of that ~mieh is 
assimilated to llllil..tter. 3 Again, in the two main treatises on .ulat-
ter whioh have already been considered, Plotinus e..ffirms that 
matter is evil because of its utter destitution and lack of any 
real partiCipation in the 000d.4 'rhe treatise on matter as the 
principle of evil is, therefore, merely a development of Plotinus f 
earlier thought end is conSistent, as this chapter will attempt to 
show, with his philosophy of matter as already explained. 
Those who inquire into the source of the evil in beings would 
do best, Plotinu.s e ays, to discover first the nature of evil; its 
source would then become apparent at once. But evil cannot be 
known directly, since knowledge is had through siuulitude vlith 
Idea-forms and evil is the very absence of such forms. The only 
way in which we can come to a knowledge of evil is indirectly 
through knowledge of good; the act of knowing the good will also 
included a knowledge of its contrary, which is evil.5 
2I. 6. 5, 49. This is the first treatise in Porphyry1s 
chronological list (Life of Plotinus, c. 4). His chronological 
list may not give the-iOsOIute orner of Plotinus' works, but 
I. 6 is certainly among the first of them. 
3v. 9. 10, 18-21. This treatise is fifth in Porphyry's 
chronological list. 
411 • 4. 16 and III. 6. 11. Porphyry lists II. 4 as the 
twelfth treatise and III. 6 as the twenty-first. 
5I. 8. 1. 
In accord with this program ~or attaining a knowledge of the 
nature of evil Plotinus goes on to de~ine what he means by good. 
This he does by defining the nature of !h! Good and the other two 
hypostases of the Intellectual Rea1m. The Good is that upon which 
all others depend but which is entirely sufficient to itse~t. 
Rous and the Great Soul prooeed trom the Good, but they possess 
true being none the less and are in their own way the source and 
term ot beings on lower levels; they are, in a proportionate way, 
truly good. Among such beings as these, Plotinu8 says, there is 
no ev11. but only the primary, seoondary, and tertiary go04. 6 
Since there is no evil to be found in the Intellectual Realm, 
which is the realm of true being, it will be necessary to loOk tor 
evil in the realm of non-being. There it will be tound to be a 
quasi tor.m ot non-being (olov ,loas ~l ~oO ~~ 8v~os Sv)7 and will 
pertain to whatever participates in non-being. Some idea at the 
na ture ot evil oan be had by oonsidering what something would be 
whioh lacked all measure, l1m1t, and tor.m; such are the character-
istics at evil. Evil is "forever undetermined, entirely unstable, 
utterly passive, never settled, completely poor. n8 
Moreover, we must not mistake the t rue nature of evil by con-
sidering these characteristics as merely accidental attributes; 
6I. 8. 2. 
7I. 8. 3, 4-5. 
8 Ibid., 15-16. 
-
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indeed, they derine the very essence of evil. Wherever evil it-
se1t is found, there too will be found all the oharaoteristios 
mentioned above. Whatever partioipates in evil beoomes like to 
evil, but it does not become essential evil. 
The properties of evil, i.e., formlessness, indeterminate'" 
ness, eto.,do not inhere in some alien subject (here, ~ ~~6~Taa,~) 
but they are their own subject. This is necessarily so, Plotinus 
says, since the lack of form and determination, which is the 
essence of evil, must have a prior existenoe in itself before it 
can acoidentally qualify another being. Just as there is the 
absolute Good and seoondary goods deriving from it, so there must 
be the absolute evil (KOKOV TO oGTO) and secondary evils which are 
aooidental to other beings. 
It must be, therefore, that there exist an absolute limit-
lessness, an absolute formlessness, and so of all the 
other properties which charaoterize the nature of $Vi1, 
and, 1£ besides evil ltself there be some evl1 thing, 
it is so either beoause it is mingled with evil or tends 
toward evil or is produotive of evil. Indeed, reason 
discovers that the substratum for patterns, forms, shapes, 
measures, and 11m1ts--a substratum whlch is reduced to 
order by an order not 1 ts own and which of ltself has no 
shatte in good and is merely an image of belng--ls the 
very essenoe of evil, if there can bl an essence of evil. 
This is the first and absolute evll.~ 
Plottnus notes that the non-being of evil is not equivalent 
to that which is altogether non-existent. 10 When evil 1s said to 
9~., 30-40. Trans. based on Brehier, Enneades, I, 118. 
l0ill!., 6-1. MJt 5v OE o(h, TO 1t'(lVTt:XWs ll~ 5v. 
be non-being, the meaning is that it is something other than be-
ing. PlotinuB attempts to specify what he means by saying that 
the difference of evil from being is not the difference of motion 
and rest from being; it is the differenoe of an image of being 
from true being. 
Up to this point in his treatment of evil Plotinns has mere-
ly been determining the nature of evil in itself. Not once has 
he mentioned matter. Yet it is clear that his description of 
evil 1s almost exaotly the same as that of matter. Both evil and 
matter are the very laok itself of all form and determination; 
both are said to be non-being; and both are ultimate substrata 
with which other beings are mingled or on which they are reflected 
The identification of matter and evil is virtually established, it 
only remains for Flotinus to make it explioit. 
Plotinns introduces matter into his discussion of evil by 
showing that beings are evil to the extent that they are associ-
ated with matter. This is true of bodily beings and also of in-
dividual soulse It is natural to bodies to be evil in some way 
or other, because they necessarily participate in matter.ll Even 
the forms in them are not true forms, but merely images of the 
Idea-forms. Bodies are in a constant state of flux, unable to 
maintain for long whatever degree of reality they may have. 
Matte~, the purely potential, prevents them tram attaining to the 
llI. 8. 4. 
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stabIlIty of true goodness and being. 12 
While bodies have some degree of evil natural to them, souls 
are in themselves entirely good; evidence of this fact is that 
there ~e some souls which are not at all evil. The evil soul is 
the one which is enslaved to that phase of itself from which vice 
naturally arises. This phase of the soul is the irrational ele-
ment, which is open to evil either through excess or defect. The 
soul which is in the service of this phase of itself suffers in-
temperance, cowardice, involuntary affections, false opinion, and 
all the other vices observed in evil souls. l ) 
But how explain an irrational element in that which is of 
itself good? It is simply that the evil soul, though not vicious 
in itself, is associated with matter through its material body.14 
Even the rational part of the soul is influenced by this associa-
tion with matter. The passions of the body obscure its clear vi-
sion and turn its attention from the consideration of true being 
120f. III. 9. 8. 
131 • 8. 4. 
14It is frequently difficult to reconcile the modes of ex-
pression which Plotinus uses in isolated statements with the 
whole of his thought. Here, for example, one might think that 
every soul connected with body is eo ipso an evil soul and that 
good souls are only those separate~rrom their material bodies. 
It 1s fairly olear, however, that Plot1nus t thought is that those 
souls which attend exolusively to affairs of sense are evil, but 
that those which strive to purify themselves and attend to the 
intellectual Realm are good and pure. This thought is made ex-
plicit in I. 8. 5, ad fin. 
--
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to this material realm of becoming. It is not that the rational 
part of the soul is itself joined to matter; but matter 1s so evil 
that it can contaminate even that which merely looks toward it.15 
Clearly. then, matter is the source of all the evil which is 
found in beings below the three hypostases of the Intellectual 
Realm. For matter is "altogether without part in the Good and i8 
the very privation and absolute lack of it; whatever comes into 
any contact at all with matter becaues like matter. n16 
The teaching of Plotinus on this point is clear enough; but 
can it explain the particular evils in the sensible universe? 
Fire, for example, burns, causes pain, and destroys; sharp in-
struments cut; soae things are poisonous to man and animals. In 
sueh cases it is not matter which causes evil, but rather the 
body which is composed of a form 1n matter. Hence, the evil ought 
to be asoribed more to the particular form than to matter. 
Plotinus takes up this objection and, on the basis of his 
own cosmology, is able to give an answer. 17 Bodily qualities 
which produce evil do so precisely because they are qualities en-
gaged in matter. The forms Which have entered into matter are 
merely images of the true forms, 1.e., the Ideas, which ~emain in 
themselves separated t'~om matter. The true, sepa~ated .fo:rms do 
1.51. 8. 4. 
l6Ibid., 22-25. Trans. by the suthor. 
171• 8. 8. 
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not produce evil; absolute rire does not burn, nor, in general, do 
any of the absolute for.ms produce those effects which their images 
in matter are said to produce. The reason why forms engaged in 
matter produce evil effects 1s that matter comes to dOluin.ate the 
forms and oorrupt them by opposing its own lack of form and de-
termination to their order and determination. Thus matter is able 
to bring it about that the fornlS cease to belong to themselves as 
forms only and that they take on the characteristics of matter, 
just as food takes on the nature of the animal which oonsumes 
it. l8 
Evil .. as Plotinus observes, does not oonsist in just any de-
fect whatsoever, but in the complete lack of the Good. Even Noue 
and the Great Soul fall short of the supreme perfection of the 
Good, but they are not thereby evil. But where the lack of the 
Good is total and complete, there is found true evil. This total 
lack is found nOWhere but in matter. 19 
Matter, then, is the principle of evil precisely because it 
is the absolute lack ot all true participation in the Good. Mat-
ter is the contrary of the Good; and the contrariety here is the 
greatest possible, since it is the contrariety ot essenoes. The 
exrunples of contrariety with which we are familiar are the oontra-
rieties of qualities, e.g., sickness and health, hot and cold. 
181bid• 
-
191. 8. 5. 
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But the Good (l.e., the One) has no qualities; hence, nothing can 
be oontrary to it merely by virtue of some aocidential attribute. 
Therefore, if the Good is to have a oontrary, there will be con-
trariety ot essences. 
The contrary of that Whioh is true being will be that which 
is non-being; the contrary of the Good and the souroe of all good 
things will be evil and the source of the evil in things. In all 
other cases of contrariety the opposed members have some common 
element between them, either belonging to the same genus or 
species or at least to the same subject. But in the oase of the 
contrariety of essences between the Good and evil, there is no 
common el~lent; all the characteristics of the one are entirely 
opposed to those of the other. 20 Thus, whereas the One is not 
good attributively but is essential Good, matter is not evil 
attributively but is essential evil. 
In his treatment of the impassivity of matter Plotinus makes 
the statement that ohange can occur only through the interaction 
of contraries, as has been seen; he goes on to imply that matter 
has no contrary, since it is not subject to change. 21 Does the 
present doctrine that matter as evil is the contrary of the Good 
represent a contradiction of Plotinus' earlier work on the impas-
sivity of matter? Does it indicate a change in his theories? 
20I. 8. 6. 
21III. 6. 9. See above, Chapter IV, p. 54. 
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It would seem that an in8pection ot the contexts in which the 
various statements occur otfers the possibility ot reconciling the 
two opinions. In the earlier treatise on the impa8sivity ot mat-
ter Plotinus was concerned to show that the substratum ot material 
bodIes remains unattected by the ohanges whioh oocur in bodles. 
Bodily ohanges oocur by oontrary forms replaoing one another, 
while those whioh are not contrary leave each other unaftected. 
But these bodily qualities act on eaoh other only through a medi-
um. Heat, for example, aots on coldness by making a cold body 
hot. or, in the case of the basic elements, tire replaces air by 
acting upon their common substratum, namely, matter. But, sinoe 
matter is the ultimate substratum, there can be no contrary to it 
which could act upon it through the medium of some further sub-
stratum. In other words, there can be nothing contrary to matter 
as hot is contrary to cold. Hot and cold are oontrary qualitIes 
whioh modify something else, matter i8 not a quality, but it is 
the very ground for all the qualitative changes ot bodies. 
On the other hand, when Plotinus is treating of the opposi-
tion between Good and evil, he is oonoerned to show the differenoe 
~etWGen two ultimates. Here there is no question ot the Good dis-
~laoing matter, the evil, or vice versa, through aotion upon some 
third thing as medium. It is simply that the Whole nature of mat-
ter as the formless, sub-entitative substratum 18 opposed to the 
whole nature of the Good as the tormless, supra-entltative source 
of all being and goodness. It could well be that P1otinu8' later 
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doctrine o£ the essential contrariety between the Good and matter 
as evil represents a modification and correction of his earlier 
thought. But there is no indioation that he ever changed his mind 
about the impassivity of matter and its lack of a qualitative con-
trary. 
It is interesting to note that in two incidental pOints, 
namely, the knowledge of evil and its necessity, Plotinus' treat-
ment of matter as the principle of evil parallels his treatment ot 
it as the substratum of bodily qualities. The substratum of the 
material world is known, as has been .een,22 by a sort of ttspuri-
ous reasoning" in which the intellect comes to af.flrm the exist-
ence of the formless, just as the eye mows darkness. The process 
is similar in the case of evil. Vice is not knowable directly but 
only as a divergence from virtue. From a knowledge of partial 
evils, such as vice is, we can conclude to vhat absolute evil muat 
be, which is altogether without fo~ or any share in gOod. 23 Thus 
Plotinus holds that matter, both as evil and as a substratum, 1s 
known by abstraction from the order and determination which we 
know in beings. 
The necessity for matter as a substratum is to be sought in 
the inexorable law of emanation. Matter and the material universe 
must exist in order that the productive power of being be exhaust-
22ChaPter III, pp. 41-42. See II. 4. 10. 
23 I. 8. 9. 
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ed.~ The neoessity of evil is also bound up with the emanational 
prooess. "Sinoe the Good is not the only eXisting thing, it is 
inevitable that in the procession outward from it • • • there be 
a last term after which nothing more can come to be; this tel'!l1 
will be evil. There must necessarily be 80mething after tne 
First; so too there must be a last. This last is matter, which 
has nO part in the Good. This is the necessity of evil."25 
It would be a mistake to conclude from Plotlnus' doctrine on 
matter as the essential evil and the principle of all other deriv-
ed evils that he considers the material universe to be wholly evil 
The universe i8 a reflection of the true beings of the Intellectu-
al Realm; as such, it has ita own beauty, order, and perrection. 26 
Evil never exists by itself, as Plotinu8 remarks at the close ot 
his treatise on evil.27 Thanks to the power of the Good, "evil 
necessarily appears bound around with the bonds of beaut,._ ,,28 
So~e commantators on P10ttnus profess to see a contradictIon 
in his treatment of matter as the potential substratum and as the 
principle ot evil. Armstrong, for example, says: ex-
24see Chapter III, pp. 42-43, and the reterences to Plotinua 
cited there. 
251• 8. 7, 17-23. Trans. based on Br$hier, Enneades, I, 123. 
2~.g., see II. 2. 3J II. 9. 8; V. 1. 4. 
27 I. 8. 15. 
28Ibid., 24-25. 
-
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amine shortly the well-known contrad1ction in Plotinus' aocount of 
matter in the world of the senses. He varies between regarding it 
as a purely negative conception, absolute potency, and as a posi-
tively eVil, anarchic force with a power of reSisting form.,,29 
Dean Inge also Lmplies that the two viewpoints are irreooncilably 
opposed. 30 
On the basis of the exposition of Plotinus' philosophy ot 
matter and evil as given in this chapter and the two preceding, it 
would seem that the opposition between the two aspects of matter 
is not as great as Inge and Armstrong would have it. It becomes 
apparent upon reading the tour main treatises on matter that the 
substratum of the material universe and the essential evil are de-
scribed largely in the same terms. Both substratum and evil are 
said to be non-being, though not pure nothing. Both are the in-
definite, the negatively infinite, the formless, that which has nO 
share in the Good. Both substratum and evil are known by a cer-
tain indefinite or formless knowledge, which is had by abstraction 
from the order and determination observed in partioular beings. 
Again, the neoessity of matter as a substratum and as evil 1s the 
necessity of completing the outpouring ot being from the One, the 
Good. 
29Armstrong, The Architecture ot the Intelligible Universe 
~ ~ PhllosoEhl it P1otinus, p. 8~. ---
3°Ing., ~ PhilosophZ ~ Plotlnus, I, 134. 
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The orux of the whole question may very well lie in what 
meaning is given to the term evil. If one reads into evil some 
meaning of one's own, then there can very readily t. a contradic-
tion between evil as the reader sees it and the substratum as Plo-
tinus sees it. If, however, Plotinus' concept of evil is kept in 
~nd. the opposition between the two aspects of matter may not be 
so great. Now it seems fairly clear that Plotinus' concept of 
evil in the treatise devoted explicitly to the subject 1s largely 
negative. Evil is the form~.s8J the unordered, the complete ab-
sence o£ Good) those things which are partially evil are so be-
cause they possess some excess or defect, whioh indioates some 
lack of order and determination. 
It is quite true that Plotinus' ooncept of evil logically re-
sults in mintmizing moral evil and reducing it to a sort ot 
physioal evil, sinoe the vice of the soul arises through its con-
tact With matter. 3l But if we accept his definition of evil and 
oompare it with his definition of matter as a substratum, the oppo 
sition between the two concepts does not appear to be as great as 
some would have it. Brehier, for example, says that the positive 
aspect of Plotinus' conoept of evil is merely an appearanoe. 32 He 
proposes to resolve the apparent oonfliot in P1otinus' two views 
• 
3lcr. B. A. G. Fuller, The Problem ot Evil in Plot1nu8 (Cam-
bridge, Eng., 1912), p. 274.- - --
32Brehlel', .&!. philosoph1e .2!. Plotin, p. 206. 
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of matter on the basis of the dynamics of the procession and re-
turn of being. From the viewpoint of procession matter is evil, 
since it fascinates the Great Soul and attracts forms to itself; 
from the viewpoint of the return of the forms back to their intel-
ligible principles matter appears as that which is illuminated by 
the forms and which receives trom them whatever degree of exist-
ence it has .. 33 
The reason why evil in Plotinus' philosophy appears to same 
commentators as a positive torce may be that they ooncentrate too 
exolusively on evil in connection with the soul. The question ot 
the human soul and its oonversion away trom the SOlicitations ot 
the sense world was, without doubt, an absorbing interest for Plo-
tinus. In this oontext Plotinus envisages the soul struggling to 
regain or maintain its proper independence of material things. 
His philosophy as a whole, however, oannot be reduced Simply to an 
ethic. If, then, we wish to reconstruot Plotinus' basic notion ot 
matter, we must distinguish between his metaphysics and his mysti-
oism. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE METAPHORICAL DESCRIPTION OF MATTER 
There has been a deliberate effort in the preceding chapters 
of this thesis to avoid reference to Plotinus' use of metaphors in 
the description of matter. The intention behind this approach was 
to gather these metaphors into a single chapter where they could 
serve as a confirmation and a review of the doctrines already dis-
cussed. 
As anyone familiar with the Enneads knows, Plotlnus makes 
liberal use of the metaphor to illustrate his point. Furthermore, 
Plotinus' use of the imaginative metaphor cannot Simply be reduced 
to a literary embellishment; he very frequently uses it to suggest 
by analogy what language is not so well adapted to express direct-
ly.1 Clear examples of this use of the metaphor are the radiation 
from the sun and water gushing forth from an undiminished spring 
to illustrate the idea of emanation. In his discussion of matter 
~.g., se. III. 6. 12, 6-8, where Plotinus explicitly as-
cribes this motivation for the use of examples to one of Plato's 
metaphors. On this pOint Brehier observes (La philosoph!e de 
Plotin, p. 20): "t'image, chez Plotin, ntestpoInt un ornament 
extdrleur, mais un element integrant de la pens... 11 vise, en 
afret, comma il Ie remarque souvant, ~ exprimer des realites que 
de langue est impuissant a rendre. 11 reste ales suggerer par 
analogie." See also Pistorius, Plotinus ~ Neoplatonism, p. 1. 
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Plotinus uses the metaphor to clarity and highlight what he has 
already said. It must be noted, however, that Plotinus does not 
simply abandon himself to the use ot images in his philosophYJ h. 
i. frequently the severeat oritic of his own metaphors,2 as will 
be seen in the course of this chapter. 
The sub-entitative charaoter of matter is its most distin-
gui.hing note and the baais for all else that P10tinus saJa about 
it. Speaking precisely in the context of the non-being and unre-
ality 01' matter, Plotinus says that it is "the image and phantasm 
01' mass and the desire for subsistenoe. n ) He goes on to add that, 
even though matter is an unstable (o~ p£vov) image, it does not 
have the strength to withdraw (~s~ys,v), so utterly lacking 1s 1t 
in the pOwer of true being.4 Basically the same metaphor et bodi-
ly weakness combined with phantom existence is also used 1n the 
treatise nOn Potential and Actual Being" to emphasize the unreali-
ty ot matter: "It. {jPatte'!J 18 a sort of feeble and obscure image 
(&ae£vl~ T' Kai &~uopov sfOmAov) which cannot assume any tor.m. n5 
~.g., see the discussion of the divisibility of the soul in-
to parts at the beginning of IV. 3 and of the use of the simile 01' 
radii to illustrate the union of all beings with their common 
source in the One in VI. 5. 5. ct. Armstrong, The Architecture ot 
the Intelligible Universe 1n the Philosophy ot Plotlnus. p. ~, --
n • .3. - - - - --
3-III. 6. 7, 13. 
4. 8 Ibid •• 1 -20. 
-5 II. $.5, 21-22. Trans. by Katz, p. 133. 
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This non-entitative aspect of matter is brought out in other 
images as well. P10tinus likens matter to a beggar in its contin-
ual striving to attain some share in real being. 6 Or again matter 
as a limitation on the creative aotivity ot the Great Soul, is 
said to be the "sediment of the superior beings, bitter and ambit-
tering,n7 On another ocoasion, in an effort to distinguish be-
tween matter 1n the sensible world and in the intelligible world,8 
Plotinus says that sensible matter 1s qeither living nor intellec-
tual, but that it is "a dead thing which has reoeived order (vt-
KPOV K&KOa~n~&Vov) ."9 
In the sections treating of the knowledge of matter, both as 
substratum and as the prinCiple of eVil, it was seen that matter 
is known by a sort of "spurious reasoning" 1n which the soul be-
comes indeterminate, as it were, in order to know the indetermi-
nateness and formlessness of matter.10 The oomparison which Plo-
tinus tinds most helpful to bring out his meaning here is the "vi-
siontt which the eye has of darkness. Disoussing the question ot 
the knowledge ot formless matter in the treatise "On the Nature 
6 III. 6. 14, 8-10. 
7II~ ). 17, 23-24. olav ~noa~6e~~~ ~~ nponyou~lvmv n'Kpa~ 
Kal n'Kpa no,ouan~. 
aFar the distinotion between sensible and intelligible matter 
see Appendix. 
9I1 • 4. 5, 18. 
lOSes Chapter III, pp. 41-42, and Chapter V, p. 70. 
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and Source o~ Evils," he says that, just as the eye withdraws from 
the light in order to see darkness (TO aKOTO~ ), so the intellect 
abandons its own interior light 1n order to see that whioh is its 
very OPPosite. ll Matter is to the intellect, then, as darkness is 
to the eye; and both faculties have to perform acts contrary to 
their natures in order to have knowledge of these objeots. 
The same comparison of matter to darlmess was used in the 
earlier treatise "On Matter," where Plotinus was oonsidering mat-
ter as the substratum of the material world. Through the use of 
our intelligenoe we come to know that matter is the ultimate depth 
In eaoh material thing. "Hence all matter is dark, beoause reason 
(& A6rO~) Is light, and intelleot is reason. Hence, too, intel-
lect, in oonsidering the logos in eaoh thing, judges that what i8 
beneath ~e logo!7--as a thing beneath light--is dark. just as 
the eye, whioh is a thing of light, extending itself to the light 
and to colors, which are modes of light, Judges that what 1s be-
neath colors is dark and material and 1s oonoealed by the col-
ors. ttl2 
The image which Plotinu8 uses most frequently in connection 
with matter is that of a mirror. The point which he wishes to em-
phasize through this metaphor is the impassivity of matter. nBut 
11 I. 8. 9, 19-26. 
12 II. 4. 5. 7-12. Trans. revised from Taylor, p. 25. See 
also II. 4. 10, 13-17. 
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if' someone should say that mirrors (TQ KaTo1cTa) and transparent 
things in general surf'er nothing from the images that are seen in 
them, he would adduoe an appropriate example. Those things whioh 
are in matter are images, and matter is even more impassive than 
mirrors."l) The idea here is that the f'orms in material beings 
are merely ref'leotions in matter of the Ideas and logoi in the In-
telleotual Realm, and that matter is even less af'f'eoted by what i. 
reflected in it than a mirror is by what appears in it. 
Although a mirror was obviously Plotinus' f'avorite metaphor 
for illustrating the impassivity of matter, he was not altogether 
unoritical of it. The mirror itself is visible, since it posses-
ses some degree of reality and has its own for.m. Matter, however, 
is not visible in itself, sinoe it laoks all form in itself and 
has no share in true being. When we view things in a mirror, 
there is no inclination to mistake the reflections for real beings 
We see the mirror itself and observe that the reflections come and 
go while the mirror remains constant. In no case, however, is 
matter visible; we cannot observe matter as such under the image. 
refleoted upon it, much less without any image whatsoever. It is 
precisely beeause we cannot see matter itself that we ~e inclined 
to accept the rerleotions upon it as real beings, just as we would 
not doubt the reality of reflections in an invisible mirror, it 
131I1 • 6. 9, 16-19. See also III. 6. 7, 40-43 
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somehow the ~ef1ections could ~ema1n tor observation.~ 
In line with his reservations on the metaphor of the mirror 
P10tinus offers another comparison which, he feels, gives greater 
emphas1s to the invisibility of matter. "The condition of matter 
is much the same as that of a1r which is invisible even when illu-
m1nated, because, even when it is not illuminated, the a1r is 1n-
vis1ble. tt15 The meaning of this is that matter is like air inas-
muoh as no one ever sees matter, whether with or without form, 
just as no one ever actually sees the air, whether it is 1llum1na-
ted or not. 
Again, in taking up the problem of the impassivity ot matter 
In partioipating in true being,16 Plot1nus says that whatever 
share 1n being may oome to matter reflects back from 1t "like an 
eoho from smooth and even 8urtaces. n17 He goes on to add that 1t 
is preoisely because the sound is reflected baok trom eohoing sur-
faces that we are led to think that it arises there. The unstated 
oonolusion 1s that we are led to attribute reality to material be-
ings for a similar reason. 
In another comparison matter is likened to a mother. Thi. 
~I1I. 6. 13, 38-49. 
15 Ibid., 41-43. 
CPl'Dt'! 0'9£ 't c; l1q?av,;c; l at' \ 
£copa'-o. 
'AAAU '-O\oO,-OV ,-, naaxe\, orov Ka\ A A~p 
Kat '-01'£, 81'\ xai ~v£u 1'00 q?mT\a9~va, oOX 
16See Chapter IV, pp. 56-57. 
17I11• 6. 14. 24-25. 
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metaphor is one handed down to P10tinus from other souroes. the 
18 
most likely one being the 'rimaeus. He accepts this metaphor 
only with reservation, because he feels that the role of a mother 
in the generation of offspring is too active to express the true 
nature of matter. If a mother is assumed to be Simply a containe 
(&s ~~ObeXO~evD~ p6vov) of her offspring and to give nothing ot 
her own substance to it, then Plotinus is willing to allow the 
comparison. He does feel that another comparison from Plato,19 
that of "recipient and nurse (ll~oooX1) Kai 'n0t)vl'l) ,n is more suit-
ed to bringing out the receptive and unproductive aspeot of matte 
Matter is simply the substratum, impassive and unresponsive, to 
the Ideas and logoi which are reflected upon it. 20 
From this brief study of Plotinus' metaphorical descriptions 
of matter the main characteristics of matter as they were seen in 
the preceding expository ohapters are found to be confirmed. 
Physical weakness and phantom existence describe the non-being of 
matter; the knowledge of matter is the knowledge of darkness; the 
impassivity of matter is that of a reflecting surface such as a 
mirror; and the sterility of matter makes the time-honored compar-
ison with a mother somewhat unacceptable. These metaphors, be-
sides serving as a confirmation of Plotinus' doctrine on matter, 
18plato, Tlmaeus, 50 d, 2-3 and 51 a, 4-5. 
19 Ibid., 49 a, 6. 
20 III. 6. 19, 17-25. 
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are also very useful aids for understanding Plotinus f meaning. It 
is for this latter purpose, of cou~se, that he used them. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The preceding discussion of the nature of matter has elabor-
ated the most important and significant aspects of Plotinus' doc-
trine. A brief restatement of the conclusions already obtained 
will serve to recall the main outline of his position. 
Perhaps one of the best su.mmary answers to the question "What 
is Plotinian matter?" would be that is is the inert, impassive 
ground of the material world. Matter is the ground for material 
beings in much the same sense that~ a movie screen--to employ an 
up-to-date ana10gy--is the ground for the scenes which appear on 
it. Matter thus conceived is a substratum, a ~~OKE(PEVOV, and, to 
some extent, a receptacle or tl1tOOOX~. 
Other characteristics of Plotinian matter worth noting here 
are its sub-entitative existence, its necessity, and the fact that 
it is kno·wn. by reason alone. P10tinus classifies matter as noo-
being because of his decidedly Greek concept of being. Being is 
the limited and deterluined. But matter is indetermina.te and nega.-
tively infinite; hence, it is not a being. The One also is un1~­
ited and undetermined and, therefore, not a being; but there is no 
room for confusion here, because the One is above being as its 
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source, while matter is below being as the bare substratum of that 
last outpost of being, the material world. 
1 The necessity of matter, as has been seen, is the very nece. 
sity Of emanation itself. This necessity requires that the pro-
ductive power of being, which has its source in the One, extend 
itself as far as it can go. An emanation advances through its 
various stages, there is increasing multiplicity and degradation 
of unity; NOllS is less unified that the One, and the Great Soul is 
less unified than Nous. When the Great Soul comes to produce the 
next level of being below itself, multiplioity is already so far 
advanced that the only possibility is that these beings be actual-
ly distinct and separate from one another. But this would not be 
possible unless there were some ground or base capable of receiv-
ing such distinction and separation. This base is matter. 
It 1s also worth noting that matter i8 known only through ra-
tional analysis and a so-called ff spurious reasoning. ,,2 P10tinus 
was no materialist; in fact, he reacted violently to the material-
ism of.' the Stoics. Plotinian matter is not something one gets his 
hands on and sees and feels. In this sense it is a philosophical 
reality and is known only in terms of a search tor the ultimate 
principles of the material world. 
In addition to being the substratum ot material beings, mat-
Isee Chapter III, pp. 42-i~3. and Chapter V, pp. 70-71. 
2See Chapter III, pp. 41-42. 
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ter is also the essential evil and source of all secondary evils, 
as is clear from a study of the text of Plotinus. This aspect of 
matter follows as a corollary from its non-entitative indetermi-
nateness. Plotinus defines good in terms of ~ Good (i.e., the 
One) and those beings which participate in the Good. The only 
choice then is to place evil outside this participation in the 
Good; and matter is the only thing which has no true participation 
in the Good. 
With this picture of matter in mind one is led to wonder just 
what Plotinus thought a material body was. The whole tenor of the 
Enneads shows that Plotinus is inclined to emphasize the unreality 
of the material universe. 3 A material being, &s Plotinus sees it, 
is matter, which is non-being, plus an image of an Idea-form whose 
true existence is in the Intellectual Realm. It is slight wonder, 
then, that with this view of lnaterial beings Plotinus should as-
sign them a minuuum degree of reality. 
Though Plotinus speaks in Aristotelian terms of forms exist-
ing in matter and of matter receiving forms, he obviously envis-
ages no strong union between matter and for.m. Matter is a condi-
tion for the existence of image-for.ms and the material beings 
which result from a union of form and matter, just as a mirror is 
a necessary condition for the appearanoe of reflected images. It 
3Th1s idea is very clear in III. 6. 6, where Plotlnus argue. 
Wor the unreality of material beings despite their appearances of 
reality. 
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seems olear that Plotinu8 views the union ot matter and fo~ al 
being no oloser than that of the mirror and the figures refleoted 
in it. The only ditterence is that in the case of the mirror and 
the refleotions the mirror has the greater reality, whereas 10 the 
case ot me. tter and torm the Im.age"",torm has more reality than the 
matter in which it appears.4 
It is instructive to note some at the differences between 
Plotinus t concepts of matter and material being and those of St. 
Thomas and the later Thomistic Scholastics. First of all, St. 
Thomas and the Scholastics include matter within the pale 01' be-
ing, though not without qualification. Plotinus had to exclude 
matter from the rea1m 01' being beoause his notion of being was 
univocal. at least to the extent that being was equated with a 
certain type ot existence, namely, finite existence. The Scholas-
tics, on the other hand, are able to include matter under being 
because their analogous notion of being extends from the p~elt 
potency (1.e., prime matter) to the purest act (i.e., God). Mat-
ter tor them 1s a principle of being and rightly called a being 
because it is ordained to substantial existence. 
Another point ot radical difference in the two v1ews ot mat-
ter 1s concerned with its impassivity. As Plotinus saw it, the 
potency of matter 1s never really actualized by the torms which 
4FOr a detailed description of the union between matter and 
torm and the way 1n wh1ch it is achieved see VI. 5. 8. 
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appear in It.5 It, for example, the Idea of a horse is being 1m-
aged on matter, that matter is nevertheless still in potency to 
6 being a horse as well as anything else. The Scholastics, howeve~ 
maintain that matter is not unaffected by its forms. When the 
substantial form of a horse is united with matter, that matter is 
no longer in potency to being a horse; it. condition is reall7 
changed from its previous mode of existence. 
A simdlar observation may be made with respect to the lnde· 
te~lnateness and infinity of matter. In the Scholastic cosmology 
prime matter, considered merely in itself, is indeterminate atl.d 
negatively infinite. But prime matter never exists merely in it-
selt, it is always limited and determined by some substantial 
torm. Plotinus, however, holds that matter retains its radical 
indeterminateness and infinity, even though it is united with 
for.ms. He would agree that matter never exists without some 
form,7 but, since the forms never really get at matter and change 
it, matter retains its essential qualities. 
As has already been noted in this chapter, the necessity ot 
matter in Plotinus' system is an absolute necessity, at least as 
absolute as the necessity ot emanation. In Scholastic philosophy 
50t • Ohapter III, p. 37, and Chapter IV, pp. 58-59. 
'!hiS view, ot course, is ultimately connected with the lack 
of a close union between matter and form. 
7 See II. 4. 3, 14-15. 
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the necessity of matter is merely the consequent necessity of a 
tact. That the material universe exists is the result of an in-
telligent and free determination on the part of the Creator. 
There did not have to be any material creation; hence, there is no 
prior necessity for the existence of matter. But once God freely 
determined to create and did so create, then matter existed of ne-
cessity. 
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the Scholas-
tic and P10tinian view of material being concerna the union ot 
matter and for... There has already been occasion to remark that 
P10tinus does not conoeive of any really strong union ot matter 
and form, certainly not the substantial union whioh was taught 
8 previously by Aristotle. Given his concept of matter as the per-
manently impassive and indeterminate substratum, it was impossible 
for P1otinu8 to unite matter and torm into a substantial unit, as 
St. Thomas d1d9 in adopting the solution of Aristotle. It could 
also be that granting substantial unity to material beings gives 
them a greater degree ot reality than P10tinus wanted to give them. 
One ot the results of P10tinus t additive union ot matter and 
fo~ is that he oomes up with a doctrine whioh greatly resembles 
the theory of a plurality of torms current in the Middle Ages. 
~.g., see Metaphysios, VII, 1), 1039 a, 3-9. 
9E_8., see S.T., I, 45, 8CI 65, 40 • ........... 
Brehier thinks that there is fla clear indication" of such a doc-
trine in Plotinus,lO and it is not too hard to find support in the 
text to~ such a view. "Fire and ea~th and the intermediaries," 
Plotinus says, "are matter and torm, but composite beings a~e many 
substanoes united (~a O~ ~uvee~a no~ ~oAAa' o&~(at &\~ lv) .n11 
Again, in the treatise ttOn Intellectual Beauty," Plotinus de-
scribes how the Ideas hold everything in their sway; matter is 
gripped by the Ideas of the elements, and to these elements are 
added other Ideas and still others. The result of this is that it 
1s "diffioult to find matte~ hidden beneath so many torms. n12 
Certainly such a view ot the composition of material beings is 
much different from the Aristotelico-Thomistic view, in which one 
-
substantial form confers all essential notes, such as corporeity, 
lite, etc. 
Since some oommentators feel that Plotinus' treatment of mat-
ter is one of the most oonfused sections in his phi1oS0phy,l) a 
brief indioation of some of the difficulties in which Plotinus 
lOBrehler, b! philosoEhie ~ ~lotin, pp. 200-201. 
ltv!, 3. 8, 8-9. 
12v. B. 7, 19-22. It is immediately following this that Plo-
tinus goes so fat as~o~a1+ even matter a form, though it be the 
last of fo~s--au~~ LgATU &.OO~ ~,faxa~ov. On this point A~ 
strong well observes (Downside Review, LXXIII, 49) that this re-
mark by Plotinus is nunp.rall.lea In the Ennead. and 1. quite in-
consistent with his normal thought." 
13 See Chapter I, pp. 1, 2-3. 
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seems to involve himself would be pertinent before conCluding this 
thesis. 
The difficulty with Plotinus' philosophy of matter is not, 
as it seems to the present author, a contradiction between matter 
as substratum and matter as essential evil, as some have said.14 
Brehier even feels that the discussion of matter as substratum in 
II. 4 leads progressively to the conclusion that matter is evil, 
a conclusion which he calls the very heart of the Plot1nian con-
cept of matter. The problem of matter in Plotinus, he adds, 1. 
not so much a physical problem--as it is with Aristotle--as it 1. 
a religious problem. lS On the other hand, Inse thinks that, it we 
consider Plotinus' philosophy as a whole, there is no identifioa-
tion of matter and the principle of eVl1. 16 In view of the inves-
tigation conducted in the preceding chapters concerning Plotinu. t 
explicit thought on this question, and a180 in view of his philo-
sophy as a whole, it is the opinion of the present author that 
Inge's conclusion is not justified. 
The real difficulty with the P10tinian system, as it seems 
14This point was discussed at some length in Ohapter V, pp. 
71-74. 
15Brehier, Enneades, II, 47. "IcJ.tte discussion est dee-
tinee a. nous amener progressivement ame conclusion (la matiere 
est 1e mal), qui est Ie centre mime de l'idee p10tlnienne de 1a 
matiere. La problem. de 1& matiere qui, chez Ari.tote, etalt un 
prob1eme physique, devient un probl'me de phI1osophi. re1igieuse." 
16 . 
Inge, !h! Phl1osophl 2! Plotinus, I, 134-35. 
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now, is not that of ~econci1ing matte~ and evil, but that of re-
oonoiling the existence of both of these with an emanational meta-
physic. The whole pOint of such a system is that eve~ything flows 
neoessa~ily from one oommon so~oe, which is the Good. Such a 
system is a tho~oughgoing monism. The~e ia only one p~inoiple or 
source tor all ~ealltYJ evil and matte~ eannot be an aetive prin-
ciple, equal but opposite to the Good, as in the dualism of the 
Manieheana. 
The question, then, is how there oan be anything opposed to 
the One; i.e., how oan there be any absolute non-being or absolute 
evil, if the One is also the Good and is produotive only of good-
ness and reality? Muoh of the diffioulty and obsourity in Ploti-
nus' discussion of matter and evil seems to a~ise from an attempt 
to retain both the disorder of evil and the absolute monism ot 
emanation. To give a olearout answer it would seem that Plotinus 
should either completely deny the existence of matter and evil or 
introduce a seoond prinoiple into his system alongside the One. 
As he actually worked the problem out in his philosophy, it ap-
pears that evil, partioularly moral evil, loses most of ita torce 
and becomes little more than a necessary concomitant or the emana-
tional process extending itself to the b1tter end. 17 
Conside~1ng Plotinus' whole philosophy of matter, what, one 
might ask, was the basic motive which led hLm to adopt such the-
170t • Wh1ttaker, ~ Neoplatonists, p. 68. 
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ories? The answer to such a question will ultimately have to be 
in terms of the basic motive of his entire systeIll, since matter is 
merely a part of the total conception. Perhaps the best answer is 
that of Brahier when he says: "The system of Plotinus, in its en-
tirety, arises from an effort to suppress everything in reality 
which can be ~pervious to the life of the sPirit.H1S And in par-
tioular with respect to his trea~ent of matter it may be said 
that Plotinus' explanation of physical reality "consists in strip. 
ping matter, and then bodies, of every positive reality which we 
experience in them, since at every stage these realities are marks 
of soul. One will be a good philosopher of nature to the extent 
that one knows how to turn the sensible world toward the world ot 
the splrlt. H19 
18Brehier, La Ehilosophie de Plotin, p. 57. "Le systeme de 
Plotin, dans aonensemb!e, na'ftttfun effort pour suppr.1mer tout ce 
qu'il peut y avail', dans ls. realite, dtopaque a 1a vie spiritu-
elle." 
19Ibid., pp. 204-20$. " £El1 le [ ••• , l'explication physique 
chez P1otIID' consiste a depouiller fa matiere, puis les corps de 
tout oe que l'experience noua montre en eux de realites positives, 
alors que, a ohaque degre, ces realites sont des traces de llama; 
on sera bon physicien dans la mesure ou l'on .aura convertir 1e 
monde sensible vers ltesprit." 
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APPENDIX 
INTELLIGIBLE MATTER 
The preceding discussion of Plotinus' philosophy ot matter 
was limited to matter in the sensible world. Another type ot mat-
ter, however, 1s referred to in the Enneads, a matter which bas 
its place among the hypostases of the Intellectual Realm. Ploti-
nus explicitly discusses this type of matter in the tx-eatise nOn 
Matter" already considered in Chapter 111.1 The purpose ot th1s 
appendix 1s to explain briefly the nature of intelligible matter 
and to distinguish it from sensible matter. 
Plotinua adduces several considerations by way of establ1sh-
ing the existence of matter in the Intellectual Re~. The taot, 
whioh he claims to have proven elsewhere, that there are many Ide-
as requires that they have some common element in their diversity. 
The particular form (~op~~) of each is the diversifying element; 
the common element is that which 1s brought to form by the Ideas, 
namel,., a matter or substratum tor the formative Ideas. Another 
consideration pointing to the existence of intelligible matter is 
l fhe full title of the treatl~e on matter (II. 4) 1s "On the 
Two types of Matter (~IEpl 1"?flv 00'0 Uh{l.)V)." The two types ot matter 
referred to are intelligible and sensible matter. 
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the fact that this sensible world, composed of matter and to~, 
is an imitation of the intelligible world; hence, there must be 
matter in the intelligible world also. Furthermore, though the 
intelligible world is indivisible, there exists there a certain 
diversity among entities; but diversity is a condition found onl7 
where there is a matter offering itself to division and distinc-
tion. 2 
Plotinus oonsiders intelligible matter as necessarily bound 
up with emanation from the One. In the emanative process two dis-
tinct moments oan be distinguished, the moment of differentiation 
or al ter! ty (~ ~ 1'& P01'flS ) and the moment ot re turn (the word used 
is a form of the verb lrcH1Tpecpru). Alter! ty i8 the moment in which 
the derived being "moves away" from the source, while return is 
the moment of "movement baok towardtl the souroe. These moments in 
emanation are not temporal moments, since emanation is an eternal 
process} they are rather analytical moments of one reality_ 
The moment ot alterity in the production of the intellectual 
hJPoatases from the One is the moment of indefiniteness and laok 
ot form in the being which is produced. In the state of alterit7 
the emanating being can be and needs to be formed and determined 
through a return to its souroe. This stage of the intellectual 
hypostases is what Plotinus means by intelligible matter. 
The moment of oonversion back to the source Is. the moment in 
• 
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which the being takes on form and determination. Nous, for exam-
ple, reoeives its torm and determination through its intelleotual 
vision of the One; this vision results in the multiplicity of Ide-
as which give torm to the indeter.mlnate and "material" moment ot 
alterity.3 
Plotinus himself points out some of the specific difference. 
between sensible matter, i.e., the inert and formless substratum 
of sensible being, and intelligible matter, i.e., the moment of 
indefiniteness in the generation of the intellectual hypostases. 
Matter in this rea1m of generated beings is ceaselessly changing 
from one form to another, while intelligible matter is eternally 
possessed of the same form. Again, sensible matter becomes all 
things in succession, while intelligible matter 18 all things at 
once.4 
Furthermore, although intelligible matter reoeives determina-
tion, just as sensible matter does, it has of itself a determinate 
and intelligent life; but sensible matter is neither living nor 
intelligent. Plotinus goes on to add that in sensible beings form 
and substratum are mere images (erbroAa), whereas in the intelligi-
ble world both form and substratum are true be1ngs.5 
3The preceding analysis is an expansion of Plotinus' words in 
II. 4. 5, 25-37. Cf. v. 4. 2. 
4xI. 4. 3, 9-17. 
5II. 4. 5, 15-20. 
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In short, then, "matter in the intelligible world is a being, 
for that which is prior to this matter is beyond being. But that 
which 1s prior to matter in this world is being; hence, {Fensibls-) 
matter is not a being, sinoe it is 'foreignt to the beauty of 
6 being." 
As is clear, the ooncept of intelligible matter is intima tel 
conneoted with Plotlnua' ooncept of emanation. Further questions 
may well be raised oonoerning the notion of intelligible matter; 
e.g., how is it a being if it 1s 1ndeter.minate? what is the dis-
tinction between intelligible matter and eaoh nypostasis? what are 
the distinctions between the various Ideas themselves and betwe.n 
the Ideas and the hypostases? I'c would be going beyond the scope 
of this thesis to attempt to olarify these questions, if, indeed, 
they can be clarified through additional study of the text ot PIa-
tinus. 
6 II. 4. 16, 24-27. Trans. by the author. 
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